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A weekend workshop entitled Space Weather Risks and Society was held at NASA Ames Research 
Center on October 15-16, 2011, to discuss humanity’s escalating susceptibility to space weather 
events. The term space weather refers to the time-variable conditions in the space environment 
that are produced by the Sun. The potential effects of space weather are well known. High-energy 
electromagnetic radiation from flares can cause radio blackouts on the dayside. Solar energetic 
particles can cause satellite damage and radiation exposure; they also cause radio blackouts in 
polar regions. Geo-magnetic storms that arise when the coronal mass ejected from the Sun reaches 
the Earth can cause transformer damage leading to potential electric grid collapse, pipeline cor-
rosion, GPS errors and loss of lock, and increased satellite drag in low-Earth orbit. The greatest 
concern is the prolonged shut-down of the electric grid, because many other key infrastructures 
depend on it. 
How do we quantify the rate of violent solar events and the risks they pose to the existing infra-
structure? If our current infrastructure were exposed to a space weather event of the magnitude 
of the 1859 Carrington event, what would happen? How many of our satellites (representing 
over $150 billion dollars of investment) would experience failure or anomalies? Our electric grid 
continues to grow larger (currently with over 160,000 miles of high-voltage lines) and more inter-
connected, thereby presenting a larger antenna. We continue to increase the operating voltage in 
our high-voltage transmission lines. Our transformers are becoming more efficient and therefore, 
more susceptible to saturation by geomagnetically induced currents. All of these technological 
advancements make us more susceptible to space weather and lowers the threshold of what would 
be considered a large-impact space weather event. 
The workshop participants unanimously agreed that the threat of space weather is real. The par-
ticipants also resonated with a finding from the 2008 NRC report on a workshop on “Severe Space 
Weather Events” which stated that “… while this workshop, along with its report, has gathered 
in one place much of what is currently known or suspected about societal and economic impacts, 
it has perhaps been most successful in illuminating the scope of the myriad issues involved, and 
the gaps in knowledge that remain to be explored in greater depth than can be accomplished in a 
workshop. A quantitative and comprehensive assessment of the societal and economic impacts of 
space weather will be a truly daunting task …” One critical problem in that task formed one of the 
focus themes of the Ames workshop: how to bring together an interdisciplinary group of scientists, 
engineers, modelers, operators, societal leaders, emergency responders, etc., to make a quantita-
tive and comprehensive assessment of the societal and economic impacts of severe space weather?
One of the main focal points of the workshop was whether we needed a dedicated organization to 
make these quantitative estimates of the societal impacts of space weather. A straw man concept 
for an organization to transform our extensive knowledge of space weather into options for pro-
tecting society was circulated at the workshop (the straw man concept paper is included at the end 
of the report). Throughout this workshop report we have referred to this organization as a Society 
and Space Weather Institute (SSWI). A key goal of the workshop was to further elucidate and 
refine the functions that such an institute might have, and how it would be organized and funded.
Executive Summary
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As we approach the next solar maximum, space weather has the attention of scientific advisors 
and key political and business leaders. Some workshop participants felt that this presented a win-
dow of opportunity to get the new institute started. Generally, it was felt that the SSWI should 
initially focus on establishing the degree to which space weather is a real threat. Currently, we 
do not have consensus on the impact of space weather on the electric grid. The system modeling 
and analysis techniques to predict the impact of geomagnetic disturbances on the electric power 
grid are not very robust. The response of the transformers to geomagnetically-induced currents 
depends on the detailed design of the transformer and depends rather sensitively on estimates 
for the ground resistivity. An accurate assessment of transformer vulnerability on a regional or 
national scale is a formidable task. A SSWI institute could bring together an interdisciplinary 
team to better define the risks and impacts of space weather. It could determine the cost/benefit 
ratio and whether action was needed to mitigate the risks. We cannot move forward on space 
weather policies until we quantify the cost/benefit ratio in a manner that its validity can be under-
stood and appreciated by non-space scientists!
There was general agreement at the workshop that a SSWI needed to be an interdisciplinary, 
independent, and international organization. It must be independent to bring our international 
partners in fully, and to provide independent and unbiased advice to policy makers. The SSWI 
needs to be interdisciplinary, because space weather crosses many disciplines. Finally, it needs to 
be international, because space weather has a large geographical footprint that crosses national 
boundaries. Various models for the institute were discussed at the workshop, based on currently 
existing institutes. Many favored the idea of a virtual institute that could easily bring in our 
international partners. Another model is to rely on in-kind contributions that would provide an 
affordable approach to obtaining contributions across the full range of national expertise. While 
no decision was made on the details of how the institute should be organized and funded, a group 
of volunteers was assembled to continue the SSWI start-up effort.
The threat of space weather is real. It is not a question of “if”, but a question of “when”. We can-
not be satisfied with status quo. A space weather calamity of epic proportions should not have 
to occur before we get the funds needed to protect our critical infrastructure. A relatively small 
investment to better define the frequency of large space weather events and their impacts on our 
existing infrastructure would mitigate the potentially large downside risks that space weather 
poses for society.
vi
1Workshop Report on
Space Weather Risks and Society 
Dr. Stephanie Langhoff1 and Dr. Tore Straume1
As technological innovations produce new capabilities, complexities, and interdependencies, our 
susceptibility to the societal impacts of space weather increase. There is real concern in the scien-
tific community that our infrastructure would be at significant risk if a major geomagnetic storm 
should occur. To discuss the societal impacts of space weather, we brought together an inter-
disciplinary group of subject matter experts and societal stakeholders to participate in a work-
shop entitled Space Weather Risks and Society. The workshop was held at Ames Research Center 
(ARC) on 15-16 October 2011. The workshop was co-sponsored by NASA Ames Research Center 
(ARC), the Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Center (LMATC), the Space Weather Predic-
tion Center (SWPC, part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOAA), and 
the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL, part of the UK Science and Technology Facilities 
Council STFC). The workshop is part of a series of informal weekend workshops hosted by Center 
Director Pete Worden.
The Program Organizing Committee included Stephanie Langhoff (ARC), Tore Straume (ARC), 
Karel Schrijver (LM Solar Astrophysics Lab), Alan Title (LMATC), Tom Bogdan (SWPC/NOAA), 
and Mike Hapgood (RAL/STFC). The 66 participants at the workshop included representatives 
from government, industry, and academia. There was a strong international contingent at the work-
shop, which reflects the global footprint of space weather events.
The program for the workshop is included near the end of the report. The first day of the workshop 
focused on characterizing the threat of space weather. Presentations were divided into four sessions:
 1. An overview of space weather consequences on society.
 2. What is the strategy for dealing with the space weather threat?
 3. A science prospective—what do we know (and not know) about the major components 
  of space weather: solar flares, coronal mass ejections, solar energetic particles, and 
  geomagnetic storms?
 4. What are the impacts of space weather on humans and infrastructure?
The second day of the workshop focused on what can be done to address the threat—from mitiga-
tion to response to recovery. If we could establish a dedicated institute for space weather, what 
would be its roles and how should it start?
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Introduction
2I. Space Weather Consequences on Society
I.1 Some Thoughts on the Societal Impacts of Space Weather
Dr. Alan Title, Senior Fellow at the Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Center, began the 
workshop by providing his perspective on space weather effects on society. While he did not 
know the function that predicts the rate of violent solar events or how these events impact power 
distribution, communications, or global positioning systems (GPS) on Earth, he did know that 
billions of dollars worldwide are being spent on studying the Sun, the magnetosphere, and the 
upper atmosphere. Furthermore, he believed that there are unknown risks with very serious con-
sequences to society from a range of solar events. 
Dr. Title introduced a new organization, the Society and Space Weather Institute (SSWI), which 
has started a study to quantify the rate of violent solar events based on the study of historical 
records, ice core data, and observations of thousands of solar type stars in the Kepler database. He 
felt that through this new entity we could set up a structure to manage the development of the infor-
mation necessary to set policy and develop regulations tailored to limit the effects of space weather. 
From the workshop, he hoped there would emerge a mutual agreement that there exists a risk to 
society from space weather. Secondly, plans would emerge to quantify that risk by using existing 
data to develop better estimates of the rate of violent solar events and to evaluate the dangers these 
solar-driven events pose to existing systems.  The institute could provide the  infrastructure for 
communications between the scientific, technical, economic, and political structures, and act as 
an interface between the research community, the modelers, the forecasters, and society. This new 
infrastructure could advise business and government on appropriate responses to space weather, 
could act as an independent assessor of the impacts of new technologies, and could develop train-
ing tools for managers of space weather responses.
In the questions following the presentation, Dr. Title stressed that this new entity was an advisory 
body, not an operational organization such as the Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) at 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). To the question of how do we 
promote the concept of this new institution in the context that these “super storm” space weather 
events are low-probability, high-consequence events, his response was that he believed there is 
sufficient concern to warrant a research effort to further evaluate the risks. We don’t necessarily 
need a large space weather event to have problems with the expanding infrastructure, especially 
considering the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of new technologies.
I.2 Space Weather Growth in Importance for Economy and Security
Dr. Louis Lanzerotti, professor of physics at New Jersey Institute of Technology, discussed our 
increasing susceptibility to the effects of space weather. He began by noting that as technological 
innovations produce new capabilities and complexities, the opportunities for unexpected impacts 
of the solar-terrestrial environment always occur. This began in 1859 with the first published 
occurrence of the effects of space weather, namely the spontaneous electrical currents observed 
3in the wires of the electric telegraph. The first widespread effects on power distribution systems, 
such as transformer tripping and power surges, were observed in the magnetic storm of 1940. Early 
wireless communications were also observed to be sensitive to magnetic storms. Radar operators 
reported “jamming”, which periodically completely disrupted the British radar defense system in 
WWII. This was later recognized to be interference by solar radio noise. Solar radio bursts also 
affect Global Positioning Systems (GPS) receivers. The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) 
coverage and availability was severely impacted by the December 2006 solar radio burst event. 
Another new technology that is significantly impacted by the radiation environment from 
space weather is satellites. For example, Telstar 1 was launched in 1962 and then failed in 
1963 from radiation damage. The more recent failure of Galaxy 15 was also attributed to a 
solar storm. Dr. Lanzerotti showed a plot (see figure 1) of spacecraft anomalies and failures as 
a function of time that was published in the National Academy workshop report on the Societal 
and Economic Impacts of Severe Space Weather Events in 2008. Although most of the events and 
failures are not attributed to space weather, it is noteworthy that the majority occurred in the 2003 
Halloween Storm. Another major concern is the increasing vulnerability of the energy grid to space 
weather events (see Section IV.2 for further discussion). A major conclusion from his presentation 
is that we live in an evolving landscape, where new technologies and capabilities drive demand 
for space weather products. New drivers for space weather understanding include civil precision 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) users, the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen), increased vulnerability of the power grid, the satellite industry, and exploration beyond 
Low-Earth Orbit (LEO).
Figure 1. Plot of spacecraft anomalies and failures as a function of time.
4I.3 Overview of the Short to Long-Term Risks and Consequences of 
Space Weather
Dr. Mike Hapgood, research scientist at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL), provided an over-
view of the short to long-term risks and consequences of space weather. Echoing the message of 
the previous speaker, Dr. Lanzerotti, he noted that our advanced technologies create our vulner-
ability to space weather. For example, he contrasted the Concorde that was first flown in 1969, with 
the Airbus A380, first flown in 2005, which uses far more modern technologies that make it more 
susceptible to the effects of space weather. Threats of space weather include induced currents in 
the power grid, human radiation exposure, upsets in electronics, communications, digital control 
systems, GPS, impacts on satellites, and interference with wireless devices.
Dr. Hapgood made the point that engineering matters! The first line of defense for space weather is 
to build robust systems that can operate through bad space weather conditions. He discussed the key 
effects of space weather beginning with solar-flare electromagnetic radiation that reaches the Earth 
at the speed of light. The X-ray flash creates a layer that absorbs high frequency (HF) radio, causes 
blackout of aviation and military communications, and creates extra ionization that affects GPS. 
Since the flare’s light travels at the speed of light, one must search for precursors to provide any 
warning and look to engineering to reduce susceptibility. Shortly behind the solar flare are the Solar 
Energetic Particles (SEPs). These energetic >Megaelectron Volt (MeV) ions penetrate spacecraft 
electronics causing single event effects, have large impacts on avionics, and can cause problems 
with ground-based electronics. The SEPs create atmospheric neutrons that are harmful to humans, 
and they require astronauts outside the spacecraft to seek cover. While nowcasts are valuable to 
satellite operators, the speed of the SEP event again requires looking for precursors for prediction. 
Then comes the Coronal Mass Ejection (CME), which plows through the solar wind to reach Earth 
in 1-4 days after the flare. Unlike the first phases of the solar event that happen very quickly, there 
is time to take procedural measures to increase the resilience of systems. The geomagnetic storm 
can have very pronounced impacts on power systems, GPS, spacecraft, etc. In addition, geomag-
netic storms and high-speed solar wind streams create hot plasma in the magnetosphere and this 
plasma causes spacecraft charging. It has been observed that space weather can cause cumulative 
damage, for example, the gradual loss of insulation in power transformers, pipeline corrosion, and 
spacecraft orbital changes. Because the more severe space weather events tend to occur near solar 
maxima, which vary on an approximately 11-year cycle, we tend to forget lessons learned from 
previous events. In addition, the technology can change on an even faster time scale to create new 
or enhanced vulnerabilities.
Dr. Hapgood discussed what we know about the long-term behavior of space weather, specifically 
solar particle events, using proxy data from nitrates in ice cores. However, interpretation of this data 
is still the subject of considerable debate (see further discussion in Section III.3). A key question that 
needs to be answered—what is the 1-in-200 year risk? This is especially important considering that 
the risks of space weather are increasing due to the greater interconnectivity of key infrastructures. 
For example, loss of a key infrastructure like electrical power could take down other key supported 
infrastructures, such as refrigeration, water/sewage, retail finance, transport, heating, etc. He ended 
by discussing how we could discourage media hype that has occurred in newspapers in Britain.
5I.4 Space Weather: From Science to Forecast to Societal Impact
Dr. Thomas Bogdan, Director of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Space 
Weather Prediction Center (SWPC), discussed the impacts of space weather on society. He dis-
cussed SWPC’s measurement scales (shown in figure 2) that characterize the three principal agents 
of space weather. The R-scale measures the mostly short-wavelength (ultra-violet and X-ray) radia-
tion from the flare, which travels at the speed of light reaching the Earth in just 8 minutes with no 
advance warning other than forecasts. This high-energy radiation causes radio blackouts on the 
dayside, GPS errors and loss of lock, and increased satellite drag in low-Earth orbit. The S-scale 
measures the severity of the charged-particle radiation that reaches the Earth in between 10-30 
minutes after the event. Charged-particle radiation causes satellite damage and radiation exposure. 
Finally, the G-scale measures the severity of the geomagnetic storm that arises when the coronal 
mass ejected from the Sun reaches the Earth in between 18-96 hours. Key adverse effects include 
transformer damage leading to potential grid collapse and pipeline corrosion. It is important to keep 
in mind that as the complexity of our systems increase, the threshold of what constitutes an extreme 
event slowly decreases.
Figure 2. The Space Weather Prediction Center’s three scales that measure the severity 
of the three agents of space weather—flares (R-scale), SEPs (S-scale), and geomagnetic 
storms (G-scale).
6Dr. Bogdan described the Space Weather Prediction Center’s vision as preparing the Nation to 
mitigate the effects of space weather through the understanding and use of alerts, forecasts, and 
data products. Their goal is to “provide the right information… in the right format… at the right 
time… to the right people… to make the right decisions.”  He indicated that NOAA and the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) have a good working relationship. Space 
weather warnings are being distributed to the FEMA National Response Coordination Center and 
the FEMA Operations Center. NOAA is working with the White House, Congress, and government 
leadership to develop and implement mitigation strategies to safeguard critical infrastructure from 
the impacts of severe space weather. He showed that the customer base for SWPC product subscrip-
tion service has dramatically increased, even though the solar activity has been relatively weak. He 
felt that the very high current interest in space weather, both in the U.S. and Europe, create a win-
dow of opportunity to perhaps launch a dedicated space weather institute. However, he cautioned 
that in dealing with the public, managing expectations is important—we want to raise awareness of 
the dangers of space weather without scaring the public with electronic Armageddon.
In the questions that followed, the good working relationship between SWPC and FEMA was 
again mentioned. FEMA has learned that R, S, and G scale events at the 1-3 level do not signifi-
cantly impact society. FEMA begins issuing alerts to customers for S4 and G4 storms. The analogy 
between terrestrial climate and space weather was raised here for the first time. Dr. Bogdan felt 
that the space weather community needs to learn from the climate community more effective ways 
to manage its message so that the risks from severe space weather are viewed in an appropriate 
context.
I.5 State Department Perspective on Space Weather
Dr. James Head, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Science and 
Technology Fellow at the U.S. Department of State, provided a State Department perspective on 
space weather. He provided an overview of the Office of Space and Advanced Technology (SAT), 
the space portfolio, and space weather activities. The most relevant activities in the space portfolio 
include GPS and Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), space weather and space situational 
awareness, and satellite-based Earth observation and remote sensing. The State Department has a 
key role in the international aspects of national space policy. SAT space weather activity in the U.S. 
government includes the National Space Weather Program Council and the Committee for Space 
Weather. They are responsible for issuing the National Space Weather Program strategic plan. The 
latest version (June 2010) has five key elements: (1) Discover and understand the physical condi-
tions and processes that produce space weather and its effects; (2) Develop and sustain the neces-
sary observational capabilities; (3) Provide tailored and accurate space weather information where 
and when it is needed; (4) Raise national awareness of the impacts of space weather; and (5) Foster 
communications among government, commercial, and academic organizations.
7I. Discussion Session
The discussion period that followed session 1 was very lively. Some of the key points that were 
made include the following:
 • The amount of funds that would be required to start a dedicated institute for space weather is   
  minuscule compared with the potential losses due to a space weather event or compared to the  
  funds spent on heliophysics research each year.
 • To get a new institute started we need to make a good business case. We should think about   
  analogies from other endeavors, for example, IT security where no one would take ownership  
  of the problem.
 • We need to look at the broader hazards landscape—for example, the Icelandic volcanoes that   
  caused chaos in Europe because no one knew what a plane could fly through. Also, we can learn 
  from the Japanese tsunami where precautions were appropriate for a 1 in 200 year event, but   
  the actual event was larger.
 • It is important to understand what the impacts of space weather are. We should form teams to   
  sell the need for action to minimize the downside risk.
 • The research community has to learn how to transfer knowledge, if the papers submitted to  
  Space Weather magazine are any example. The papers are too complex to be understood by 
  the user community. We need individuals that can interface between the scientists and the user  
  community.
 • Satellite manufacturers are very reticent to admit that their systems are susceptible to space   
  weather.
 • We should look to other examples where low probability/high impact events have successfully 
  been brought to congressional attention, such as for Earth orbit crossing asteroids.
8II. Strategic Response to the Space Weather Treat to Society
II.1 Lessons Learned from Successful Earth Science  
Research-to-Operation Efforts
Dr. James Spann, a research scientist at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), discussed 
some of the lessons learned in transferring Earth science research into operational efforts.  He 
described two decision-making tools to help nations manage areas for societal benefit, such as 
disasters, biodiversity, climate, etc. The first software package, the Regional Visualization and 
Monitoring System (SERVIR), helps governments make decisions by providing Earth observations 
and predictive models based on data from orbiting satellites. The second product is the Short-term 
Prediction Research and Transition (SPoRT) tool to assist transitioning observations and research 
capabilities to the operational weather community to improve short-term forecasts on a regional 
scale. Dr. Spann noted that we could profit from lessons learned by transitioning these two Earth 
science tools to operational status in our efforts to improve communication between the providers 
and users of space weather data.
Some of the lessons learned were a need for patience (nothing happens overnight), a commitment 
for the provider and the users to work together, a commitment at all levels of management, and 
finally the importance of end-user engagement from the beginning. The provider and user exist in 
very different cultures. The provider, usually a research scientist, focuses on detail, while the user 
is primarily concerned with making the tool work. The researcher must live in the user world long 
enough to understand it. Since the user must have some investment in the product in order for them 
to eventually own it, they should be involved in the entire transitioning process. The user’s needs 
must be identified and reassessed over time to identify conditions of satisfaction. The data must be 
accessible to the user at the appropriate frequency of update and in their chosen format. Just because 
we (i.e., NASA) have a good product, we cannot expect the user to adjust to it. Often the user does 
not have the resources needed to ingest the product. The researcher must include training and build-
ing capacity in the transition process. Of key importance is developing a trusted relationship with 
the user. To help in marketing the tool, one must demonstrate how the user benefits, especially from 
a standpoint of economic impact. Developing a strong advocate in the user world helps convince 
others to use the product.
II.2 Large Scale Analysis of GMD Impacts on the Electric Grid: Need 
for Improved Models and Analysis Techniques
Dr. Randy Horton, research scientist at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), discussed 
the need for improved modeling and analysis techniques to accurately predict the impact of geo-
magnetic disturbances on the electric power grid. The system modeling and analysis approach for 
power transformers is illustrated in figure 3. It begins with creating a DC system model to which 
one inputs the estimated electric fields that result from the interaction of the CMEs with the Earth’s 
magnetic field. The output of the model is an estimate of the “quasi-DC” Geomagnetically Induced 
9Current (GIC). The electric field and consequently the corresponding GIC depend rather sensitively 
on estimates for the ground resistivity. The GIC is then input into a time-domain transformer model. 
Dr. Horton stressed the importance of having accurate transformer models in the impact analysis. 
Transformer design is an important consideration—e.g., the response of the transformer to GIC 
depends heavily on the core design of the transformer. Details of the transformer design are often 
proprietary, which further complicates the development of accurate models. With the transformer 
model, estimates can be made of AC waveform distortion from harmonics as well as changes in 
reactive power demand or vars (vars or volt-amperes reactive is the reactive power that is stored in 
the electric and magnetic fields of the transformer). Increased var demand from storms can be sub-
stantial. Lastly, a thermal analysis is possible to estimate individual transformer vulnerability. How-
ever, the accuracy of the thermal analysis depends critically on having an accurate thermal model 
of the transformer. In summary, the flow of GIC (quasi-DC) in the power transformers causes 
semi-saturation of the core (half-cycle saturation), which leads to increased var demand, harmonics, 
and heating. When performing studies to determine the impact of geomagnetic disturbances on the 
electric power grid, the transformer is among the most important and difficult elements to model.
Considering the challenge of properly modeling a single transformer on the grid, it is not surpris-
ing that performing an AC system analysis on a continental (or national) level is a formidable task. 
To date, AC system analysis has been limited to the utility or regional level. Thus, if large-scale 
models become necessary to assess the impact of wide area geomagnetic disturbances, there will 
be numerous issues to overcome. A key conclusion of Dr. Horton’s talk was that uncertainties in 
the transformer models along with uncertainties in determining GIC values, because of electric 
field variations and changes in the Earth’s conductivity, make accurate calculations difficult. More 
research is certainly needed to improve estimates of the effects of geomagnetic disturbances on the 
energy grid. 
Figure 3. The system modeling and analysis approach for power transformers.
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A comment following the talk noted that power producers would like to have better models for 
large space weather storms such as the Carrington event to make their own assessments of impact. 
It was also noted that what the models need as input is the electric field, whereas the scientific com-
munity provides changes in the magnetic field with time (dB/dt). Other comments focused on how 
we might provide incentives for manufacturers to be more forthcoming with proprietary data that is 
critical in providing accurate transformer models.
II.3 Effects on Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
Kenneth Ward from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) discussed the effects of space 
weather on the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS). The WAAS is an air navigation aid 
developed by the FAA to augment the Global Positioning System (GPS), with the goal of improv-
ing its accuracy, integrity, and availability. The WAAS architecture consists of 38 ground-based 
reference systems, 3 master stations, 6 ground Earth stations, 3 geostationary satellite links, and 
2 operational centers. The WAAS specification requires it to provide a position accuracy of 25 ft 
or better in both lateral and vertical measurements at least 95% of the time. Actual performance is 
far better, making WAAS capable of enabling precision approach landings of aircraft. Mr. Ward 
discussed some of the current and planned upgrades to the system, such as new receivers, com-
munication upgrades, and an improved ionosphere model. WAAS is used in all phases of avia-
tion including enroute navigation, terminal navigation, and approach and landing. WAAS is also 
used for general navigation of cars, trucks, trains and ships. WAAS improves the capacity of the 
air system by providing guided departures, flexible routes, vector free arrivals, wake turbulence 
management, and enhanced weather avoidance. It is an integral part of the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen). He discussed Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance 
(LPV) approaches that can only be flown with a WAAS receiver. As of June 30th, 2011, there were 
2,520 LPVs serving 1,295 airports in the U.S.
Space weather effects on WAAS come from two principal sources—ionosphere disturbance and 
scintillation. However, other WAAS failure mechanisms such as unintentional and intentional jam-
ming, equipment and system failures, and tropospheric effects are considered to be a greater prob-
lem. He showed the effects of a “normal” space weather event. Loss of LPV approach capability 
occurred over large parts of the U.S. If GPS and WAAS had been the only means of navigation 
and approach services, the impacts to air navigation would be significant disruption causing diver-
sion to other airports, comparable to a winter weather event. Since other means of navigation and 
approach are available, the impact of space weather is manageable, albeit with a considerable eco-
nomic impact. The effects of a very severe or “Black Swan” event are not known, but the realistic 
worst-case scenario would be a significant decrease in the capacity of the air system.
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II.4 Space Weather: Impact on Cascading Power Grid Failures—A 
Simple Model and Illustration
Dr. Elisabeth Pate-Cornell, professor of management science and engineering at Stanford Uni-
versity, presented a simple model of the impact on cascading power grid failures due to space 
weather. This was a student project by three of her students—Cecilia Larrosa, Lewis Kaneshiro, 
and Jingjing Zhao. The project scope was to assess the effect of space weather on linked elements 
of the power grid in different states to analyze the effects of grid operator actions on cascading 
grid failures and to identify optimal management policies across the grid. The model involved 
loads, capacities, and economics. It specifically accounted for the solar activity forecast and the 
effects of solar activity and geomagnetic storms (loads) in different locations. The power grid sys-
tem was simplified to three states, namely Washington, Oregon, and California. The model used 
a simplified electric power grid that included generators, transmission lines, and consumers. The 
load cascading model is a dynamic model of deteriorations and cascading failures over time. The 
operation optimization assumes a pre-event load distribution that maximizes customer benefits. 
Given a warning of a solar event, operators lower capacity and re-route flow. The cascading fail-
ure dynamics simulation is based on a network model containing nodes (generators, transformers, 
lines, and customers). The assumption is made that the state of each node is influenced only by the 
state of its neighbors.
The results of the simulations show that more and more components (grid points) are lost as the 
severity of the event increases as expected when the operators take no action. Less grid points are 
lost when the operators take the extreme action of reducing production in each state by 50%, but 
still better results were obtained when the grid operators took independent action. However, the 
optimal result was for Oregon and California to coordinate their actions. Conclusions from the 
study were that the power grid system is very vulnerable if there is no warning of the solar event. 
Given a warning, the best result (i.e., minimal loss of grid points) occurs when the grid operators 
coordinate their actions. A comment from the floor was made that it would be better to use a time-
domain stability model in their analysis.
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III. Science Perspective—Solar Flares, CMEs, SEPs and  
Geomagnetic Storms
III.1 What Do We Not Yet Know About Solar Flares and Solar Energetic 
Particles (SEPs)
Dr. Richard Harrison, space physicist at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in the UK, discussed 
what we do not yet know about solar flares and Solar Energetic Particles (SEPs) in the context of 
space weather. The solar events that are important are the ones that produce impact at Earth, such 
as SEPs, Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs), and electromagnetic enhancements. Thus what is most 
relevant is the prediction of onsets, arrivals, and impacts. At the heart of the question is the relation-
ship between flares and CMEs. Recent work has disconnected the flare and CME onset. His study 
of 151 CMEs showed a strong association between CME and flare onsets, but many CMEs occur 
without flares, and the relative timing between flare onset and CME onset can vary considerably 
with either leading. He showed the solar events of August 2010, an example where the observed 
flares and CMEs are separated both in time and location on the Sun’s surface. Thus he challenged 
the standard flare model. Instead, current observations indicate that in many cases magnetically 
complex systems on the Sun result in flares and/or CMEs driven by a magnetic “driver”, not each 
other, and each may or may not occur depending on local conditions.
SEP production also occurs in association with solar events. Energetic particles consist mainly of 
energetic electrons (~1 KeV to tens of MeV) and ions (~50 MeV per nucleon to ~10 GeV). SEP 
events are of two general types—impulsive and gradual. Impulsive SEPs are accelerated in flares, 
are electron rich, have durations of hours, and occur in a relatively narrow longitude cone. Gradual 
SEPs are accelerated in CME shocks or in Co-rotating Interaction Regions (CIRs). They tend to be 
proton rich, have durations of days, and occur in a wide longitude cone.
Key remaining issues include the resolution of the flare-CME relationship and improving our track-
ing and prediction techniques to understand onset processes, to project arrivals at Earth, and to 
understand how Earth cuts through the CME structure. Outstanding questions include how the SEP 
production depends on the complex structure of the CME, and how SEPs depend on CME-CME 
interactions when there are CMEs close together travelling at different speeds. Magnetohydrody-
namics (MHD) heliospheric models are very dependent on input, such as the CME directions and 
sizes and the shock development in the models.
III.2 What Do We Not Know About Geomagnetic Couplings and  
Responses to Solar Eruptions
Dr. Robert McPherron, professor emeritus in the Department of Earth and Space Science at UCLA, 
discussed the coupling between the solar wind and the Earth’s magnetosphere. The strength of the 
interaction is determined by the rate of magnetic flux transport when magnetic reconnection occurs 
between interplanetary magnetic fields and the Earth’s magnetic field. Anti-parallel fields reconnect 
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most efficiently. Coupling depends on many things including the solar cycle. The short forecast lead 
times require that measurements obtained from satellites in orbit around Earth-Sun L1 be propa-
gated to Earth. Propagation methods are inadequate and produce large errors. In addition, since we 
cannot look directly at the Sun, the parcel of plasma that we monitor near L1 does not necessarily 
hit the Earth’s magnetic field. 
The empirical and physics-based models require accurate drivers (magnetic flux and magnetic field 
strengths). We would like to study the response of the magnetosphere for large events, but super 
storms are so rare that we do not have sufficient data to empirically determine the relationship 
between driver and the ring current. The probability that the hourly ring current exceeds 400 nan-
otesla (nT) is only about 1 in 10-5 or about once per solar cycle. Strong geomagnetic storms only 
occur preferentially when there is a strong solar wind and when the resulting magnetic compression 
lasts a long time.
In summary, we cannot accurately predict the waveforms of drivers that will eventually arrive at 
Earth, in part because we cannot propagate waveforms accurately either radially or azimuthally. It 
is likely that we will never be able to provide accurate models of the driving waveforms except with 
observations immediately upstream of the bow shock, and these details matter in the geomagnetic 
response to solar wind. Instead of trying to predict accurate waveforms, Dr. McPherron recom-
mends doing probabilistic forecasting by ensemble climatology to provide a means of calculating 
a range of response (e.g., there is 50% probability that the disturbance parameter would lie in some 
range). Ensemble averages from multiple simulation runs driven by appropriate climatology is a 
possible way to obtain reasonable forecasts.
III.3 Extremes of Solar Storms: How to Determine Statistics of Rare 
Solar Events Based on Existing or Obtainable Records or Models?
Dr. Karel Schrijver, solar physicist at the Lockheed Martin Solar Astrophysics Laboratory, dis-
cussed how to determine the statistics of extreme solar storms (“Black Swan” events). The Sun has 
been observed with instruments spanning a wide wavelength range for only about 50 years. During 
this time we are unlikely to have seen the most extreme events that can be expected from the Sun 
in its present evolutionary stage. To quantify the likelihood of infrequent extreme events, we need 
to go back further in time by making use of geological records or by looking at a sample of other 
stars of comparable age as the Sun. 
One strategy is to look for solar energetic particle (SEP) events in ice cores. The correlation between 
flare intensity (measured using photons) and SEPs will not be perfect, because energetic particles 
are produced by flares as well as in interplanetary coronal mass ejections (ICMEs), yet statistically 
it is feasible to use SEPs as a proxy for estimating the magnitude of solar explosive events. There-
fore, if SEPs interact with the Earth’s atmosphere to produce ionization shifts, inducing chemical 
signatures that can precipitate to be captured in long-lived ice deposits, conceivably this would 
provide a pre-historic (i.e., before ~1950) record of solar activity. The specific signature that was 
searched for was nitrate (NO3). It should be noted that NO3 signatures are also produced by ter-
restrial events (biomass burning), and also there is controversy as to whether there is a sufficiently 
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rapid pathway for incorporation of nitrate into the ice to leave a short-duration spike around the 
time of the flare/ICME. Of the 15 or so ice cores that have been examined to date, only one showed 
a nitrate signature that could be correlated with the Carrington event in 1859, one of the largest 
flares, if not the largest, observed on the Sun. The present conclusion from the ice-core data is there-
fore that the potential correlation of nitrate spikes in ice cores with SEP events needs to be revisited, 
and that no quantitative results from ice-core analysis can presently be used to constrain solar flare 
frequency spectra.
The second approach was to get meaningful data by looking at flares from other stars. For example, 
the Kepler satellite has observed flares in white light that are thousands of times larger than the Car-
rington event. However, these very active stars observed by Kepler are much younger than the Sun, 
making direct comparison problematic. In fact, these young stars that flare a lot appear inconsistent 
with flare data from the present Sun, even when the data is scaled to correct for the mean stellar 
level of activity. Thus, the only way we can say anything about what “Black Swan” events have 
occurred in the last 10,000 years is either to observe the Sun for this many years, or to observe flares 
from a large sample of Sun-like stars to obtain a statistical basis for predicting events on the Sun.
Dr. Schrijver ended his talk by discussing possible follow-on activities depending on priorities. If 
solar spectral irradiance variability is most important, then we should collect and study panchro-
matic observations of solar neighborhood stars. If the solar energetic particle distribution is most 
important, we should revisit the atmospheric studies and ice-core analysis. Possibly the differential 
exposure of rocks on the Earth, Moon, and asteroids would reveal the history of large SEP events.
Following the talk it was asked why the Kepler data isn’t good enough to give insight into Black 
Swan events. The response was that the Kepler data are good enough to answer the question of 
whether an X1000 flare will occur, but since it is a visible-light instrument, it cannot provide insight 
into the hardness (spectral irradiance) of the flare in the X-ray and EUV domains. Combining data 
from Kepler and X-ray observatories along with other observational data might suffice, but a con-
certed and focused effort is needed. Another question arose about extrapolating the age distribution 
of the Kepler data. The response was that they did do an extrapolation using the rotational rate of 
the star as proxy for age, but the active stars currently studied from the Kepler database are most 
likely not old enough to make the extrapolation all the way to the Sun. A comment was made that 
what we really need to know is the extremes of the solar wind.
III.4 Towards Physically Motivated Operational Flare Forecasting
Dr. Shaun Bloomfield, School of Physics at Trinity College Dublin, discussed the current state-
of-the-art in flare forecasting. Since solar flares pose significant space weather risks by producing 
greatly increased levels of ionosphere-altering X-ray and UV radiation, a worthy goal is to have an 
operational flare forecasting method that is physically motivated by the end user’s requirements. 
Predicting “no flares” may appear to be easy simply because 90-95% of the days are free of flares 
larger than a relatively small M1.0 flare, but forecasting large flares accurately is yet beyond our 
means. The specific questions that Dr. Bloomfield addressed were how well is the research commu-
nity quantifying flare forecasts, how well do existing flare probability forecasts perform, and what 
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are the relevant flare forecasts for the space-weather community? He discussed forecasts using a 
contingency table with four elements—true positives, true negatives, false negatives (missed flares), 
and false positives (false alarms). He recommended using a true skill statistic that scales correctly 
with increasing flare occurrence. Existing forecast methods can be divided into three categories—
theoretical based on behavior pattern learning, statistical from either historical flare rates or from 
Poisson flare distributions, and more recently empirical, such as artificial neural networks, decision 
trees, and wavelet predictors. There is no physics model in any of these forecast methods.
Dr. Bloomfield discussed the McIntosh Sunspot group classification scheme in conjunction with 
the Poisson prediction method. In this approach one observes a specific Sunspot McIntosh class 
(a measure of the complexity of a given Sunspot region) and based on the historical flare rate for 
that class, assigns a % Poisson probability. If that probability exceeds a threshold then a flare is 
predicted. The thresholds are tuned to the performance. The Poisson probability optimized scheme 
works well especially for predicting medium sized (M-class) and large sized (X-class) flares. The 
desired flare forecasts differ by user community. For example, commercial satellite operators want 
few false alarms to avoid unnecessarily powering down, whereas an astronaut flight surgeon would 
want few missed flares, especially X flares. Questions were directed at what are the relevant flare 
forecasts for the space weather community. It was also pointed out that flares are not always associ-
ated with a single active region on the Sun.
III.5 The Impacts of Ionospheric Space Weather
Dr. Anthony Mannucci of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) discussed the impact of ionospheric 
space weather. The variability of the ionosphere affects navigation, radar, and communication. 
Deep space navigation is significantly impacted by space weather. NASA’s Deep Space Naviga-
tion system uses 3 large antennas on the ground to communicate with spacecraft. When the signal 
passes through the ionosphere, the variability in the electron density introduces a Doppler shift that 
affects the precision of the position measurement. There is considerable day-to-day variability in 
the ionosphere, but the vertical Total Electron Count (TEC) in the ionosphere can be dramatically 
increased during a space storm. Using the two frequencies available with GPS, it is possible to par-
tially correct for errors. However, the measurement needed to remove the effects of increased TEC 
is never on exactly the correct line of sight. The International GNSS Service (IGS) global GPS 
receiver network is a valuable resource in making these corrections. This network of GPS receiv-
ers provides a continuous data stream. He showed ionospheric TEC maps that illustrate regions of 
significantly increased TEC during space storms. In major space weather storms there is too much 
structure in the ionosphere to give accurate corrections.
Civil aircraft navigation is another space weather application. Because of safety-of-life consid-
erations, very reliable bounds are required for the ionospheric error. An extreme storm detector 
has been created to warn pilots and to deny WAAS ionosphere correction during intense storms 
if required navigational accuracy is not met. Another potential threat is the under sampling of a 
highly localized “irregularity” in ionospheric TEC. He showed an example where this occurred at 
night over Florida, resulting in vertical ionospheric delay errors on the order of 1-10 meters if left 
undetected.
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Radar applications are also affected by the Earth’s ionosphere. Since applications often use a 
satellite within the Earth’s ionosphere, electron density models of the ionosphere as a function of 
altitude are needed to make corrections. Other applications of space-based radar such as ocean 
altimetry and the use of synthetic aperture radar to make high-resolution images of auroral arcs are 
also affected by ionosphere variability. Communications are affected by small-scale ionosphere 
irregularities that cause radio frequency signals to scintillate. 
Dr. Mannucci ended by noting that he had summarized the challenges of nowcasting, that is, 
estimating how applications are affected by ionospheric conditions based on limited data from a 
different time and place. However, what the community would like to have are accurate forecasts. 
Estimating the impact of space weather hours to days in advance is a formidable challenge, and 
one that requires good observational data.
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IV. Impacts of Space Weather Events On Humans  
and Infrastructure
IV.1 Predictions of Space Weather Influences on Aircraft Radiation 
Exposure
Dr. Christopher Mertens, NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC), discussed predictions of space 
weather influences on aircraft radiation exposure. Key to this effort is the Nowcast of Atmospheric 
Ionizing Radiation for Aviation Safety (NAIRAS) model. NAIRAS is a real-time global radiation 
exposure model that can predict radiation exposure (including galactic cosmic rays and solar ener-
getic particles (SEPs)) for airline pilots and crew for a representative set of domestic, international 
and polar routes. It is a decision support tool that can take specific actions, such as altering the route 
or altitude of an aircraft during SEP events. A study done in collaboration with the National Insti-
tute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) shows that median U.S. pilot radiation exposures 
would trigger monitoring in European Union states.
The NAIRAS uses the best available space weather data in its analysis of dose rates. The NAIRAS 
real-time predictions are available on line and as an iPhone app. He showed the effective dose rates 
at three altitudes for representative storms. International Commission on Radiological Protection 
(ICRP) radiation standards were not exceeded for the Halloween 2003 event, but were exceeded 
for polar and high latitude routes during the January 2005 event. He showed the dosage rates for a 
simulated Carrington-like event using the available SEP spectral flux and geomagnetic storm “data” 
that have been estimated from the historical record. During a storm of this magnitude, high-energy 
particles are seen at the lower latitudes of the United States. Studies show that a Carrington-like 
event would result in ICRP prenatal and annual limits being exceeded on nearly all U.S. flights, 
both domestic and international. 
Some of the issues that need to be solved to improve the NAIRAS model are the spectrum fitting 
of the SEP ion spectral energy distribution. Satellites are needed with greater than 1 GeV particle 
detectors to define the high-energy tail of the particle energy distribution. Another issue is to reduce 
the errors in the modeled cutoff rigidity, which is particularly important for flights along the north 
Atlantic corridor region where the magnetosphere open-closed boundary is typically located. The 
cutoff rigidity enables a specification of the minimum energy that a charged particle must have for 
transport though a magnetic field. Currently particles are transported through the magnetosphere 
using the Center for Integrated Space Weather Modeling (CISM)-Dartmouth particle trajectory 
geomagnetic cutoff rigidity code, driven by real-time solar wind parameters and interplanetary 
magnetic field data provided by the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) satellite. For the future, 
Dr. Mertens would like to fly particle spectrometers on the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared 
Astronomy (SOFIA) to validate the model and eventually have radiation instrumentation flying 
continuously.
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IV.2 Space Weather and U.S. Electric Power Grid Vulnerabilities: An 
Overview of the Risks to this Critical Infrastructure and Research  
Necessary to Assess Vulnerability and Mitigate Impacts
John Kappenman, owner of Storm Analysis Consultants, discussed the threats of space weather 
on the U.S. electric power grid.  The Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission, FEMA Execu-
tive Order 13407, and the National Academy of Sciences investigation results all agree that space 
weather risks have the potential to create large scale blackouts, and to permanently damage trans-
former assets resulting in a lengthy restoration. The large geographic footprint of a space weather 
event makes it particularly serious. Loss of electric supply will impact all other interdependent 
infrastructures on the order of hours to days. The threat is that a rapidly changing geomagnetic field 
over large regions will cause Geomagnetically-Induced Currents (GICs) to flow into the continen-
tal interconnected electric power grids (see figure 4). The magnetic field of the electrojet induces a 
voltage potential on the surface of the Earth. GICs enter the power system through ground connec-
tions. The risk to society has been escalating as a result of several factors. First, the electric grid is 
getting larger, thereby producing a larger antenna to cause GIC. Secondly, the operating voltage in 
transmission lines has been increasing with time. Finally, improvements in transformer efficiency 
have made them more susceptible to space weather, as less GIC is needed to saturate the cores. We 
have been stacking risk multipliers on top of risk multipliers. His analysis shows that large scale 
storms such as the 1921 event or the 1859 Carrington event could cause wide spread blackouts, 
especially in the Northeast. This could leave 100 million people without power for an extended 
period of time considering the time required to replace transformers.
Figure 4. Illustration of how GICs get into the continental interconnected electric power grids.
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In summary, for several decades the Nation has experienced a failure to understand how risk has 
migrated into our electric grid infrastructures from space weather threats. The failure has been col-
lective spanning the space weather community to the power grid infrastructure operators. We have 
not agreed upon a design code or operating procedures to mitigate the threat. He closed by noting 
that finding means to mitigate the threat of space weather to the electric grid might be an issue for 
a space weather institute to take on.
A question was asked if there are mitigating actions that a power company could take in response to 
a severe space weather event. His response was that even if we had perfect forecasts, the lack of an 
operational plan for responding to space weather would probably result in a disaster scenario. We 
need to eliminate the risk from the infrastructure itself if we are to avoid a catastrophic result from 
a major solar geomagnetic storm. He was asked to compare the threat of space weather to other 
major threats—e.g., Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), pandemic, nuclear attack, etc. He contrasted 
space weather as an event that was sure to happen some time in the future. Hardening against space 
weather would also help harden susceptibility to the slow pulse of an EMP.
IV.3 Impacts of Space Weather on Department of Defense Operations 
and Systems
Dr. Dale Ferguson, Kirtland Air Force Base, discussed the impacts of space weather on the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) operations and systems. Flares have an immediate impact on HF radio 
communication due to ionization of the D layer of the ionosphere by X-rays. Heating of the upper 
atmosphere increases drag on satellites. Solar weather affects the prediction of orbital drag on satel-
lites by increasing errors that increase with altitude. Scintillation occurs during magnetic storms, 
resulting in loss of communication, especially at high and low latitudes. Scintillation negatively 
impacts navigation by degrading the reliability of GPS systems. Large gradients in electron density 
profiles cause geo-location errors that affect surveillance and intelligence operations. Radio bursts 
directly interfere with GPS, communication, and radar systems, causing false targeting and blinding 
surveillance radars. SATCOM (satellite communications) are also impacted due to signal interfer-
ence and loss. Satellite sensors are blinded and degraded by solar energetic particle events.
Dr. Ferguson spent considerable time discussing sources and types of satellite anomalies. The two 
key sources of anomalies are spacecraft surface charging and deep dielectric charging. Spacecraft 
surface charging is caused by lower energy particles that can cause Electrostatic Discharges (ESDs) 
and arcing on solar arrays and power cables. Deep dielectric charging is caused by higher energy 
particles that either cause internal arcing or single event upsets caused by the ionization trail of a 
single high-energy particle in sensitive electronics. The effects can be both transient, such as bit 
flips in electronics, or permanent, such as arcs and ESDs that cause damage to the electronics or a 
solar array failure. He discussed a few anomalies and their probable causes. An example is Galaxy 
15 in 2010 where ESD caused an electronics problem coming out of eclipse during a severe geo-
magnetic storm.
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A key goal for DOD is space situational awareness. The DOD must determine whether anomalies 
are due to space weather or to hostile actions. DOD goals are real-time anomaly resolution and 
72-hour predictive space weather capability. DOD satellites tend to fail because of charging in 
dangerous periods, such as large SEP events or when coming out of eclipse. Some of the ways to 
prevent space weather charging anomalies are to harden all vital electronics, coat surfaces with 
grounded conductors, design for more secondary electron emission and less photoemission, and 
design spacecraft to prevent deep dielectric discharges. Operations can also mitigate space weather-
related effects, such as turning off sensitive electronics, thrusters, and focal-plane arrays. Ideally 
one would also like to fly charge monitors and charging mitigation systems. A question was asked if 
the DOD was concerned about autonomous systems going into fail-safe mode during space weather 
events. He noted that this was a concern and that spacecraft need to be designed to survive minor 
glitches such as these.
IV.4 Impact of a Solar Superstorm on Critical Communications and 
Society
Mark MacAlester, supervisory telecommunications manager at the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA), discussed the potential impact of a solar superstorm on critical communica-
tions and society. He discussed some of the extreme space weather events that have happened in the 
past. The Carrington-Hodgson event in 1859 that disrupted telegraph service worldwide is the larg-
est recorded event. Anecdotal historical observations suggest a storm of this magnitude may occur 
once in 500 years. The May 16, 1921 event, called the “Great Storm”, disrupted telegraph service, 
caused fires, and burned out cables in New York. A storm of this magnitude may occur once every 
100 years. The March 13, 1989 geomagnetic storm collapsed the Quebec power grid, and came 
within seconds of collapsing the Northeast and Midwest U.S. power grids. The 2003 “Halloween 
Storms” interrupted GPS, blacked out HF radio, forced emergency procedures at nuclear power 
plants, and destroyed several large electrical power transformers in South Africa.
FEMA has determined that radio blackouts (R), solar radiation storms (S), and geomagnetic storms 
(G) at levels 1-3 on the NOAA space weather scales (http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/NOAAscales/
index.html) have little impact on normal operations. Even solar radio blackouts up to level R5 
generally do not have a major impact on FEMA’s operations. Terrestrial line-of-sight public safety 
radio that uses Very High Frequency (VHF), Ultra High Frequency (UHF), and microwave com-
munications are not impaired.  He also noted that while the North American Power Grid is poten-
tially vulnerable to a major geomagnetic storm, at least some of the electric utility providers are 
implementing mitigation and response measures and stockpiling transformers. Furthermore, new 
transformer manufacturing capability is coming online in the U.S. 
In partnership with NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Center, other Federal agencies, and private 
sector telecommunications services providers, FEMA performed a meta-analysis of the largest 
experienced event, in this case a repeat of the September 1-2, 1859 Carrington-Hodgson event. 
Taking into account all three types of space weather—radio blackout, solar radiation storms, and 
geomagnetic storms—he showed how this extreme event scenario might play out in the U.S. Ini-
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tially, Earth is struck by multiple minor to strong radio blackout events causing HF disruption on 
the daylight side lasting from minutes to three hours and some shorter disruption in GPS. When a 
Carrington-scale solar flare erupts, resulting in a R5 radio blackout event, HF and GPS are more 
severely impacted. Due to the speed of this event, the solar radiation storm begins about twenty 
minutes after the solar flare and builds to an S5 level. One estimate suggests that approximately 
15% of the satellite fleet may be lost because of solar panel damage, and the remaining satellites 
will experience a significantly elevated number of satellite anomalies. Satellite communications 
(SATCOM) may be significantly impacted. When a Coronal Mass Ejection with a southward mag-
netic orientation arrives at Earth approximately 18 hours after the solar flare, it causes an extreme 
(G5) geomagnetic storm.  SATCOM and GPS may be severely disrupted due to scintillation—
variations of amplitude, phase, polarization, and angle-of-arrival of radio signals that bounce off 
of, or pass through, the ionosphere. However, by far the major impact of the geomagnetic storm 
could be widespread voltage collapse (blackouts) and potential damage to a significant number 
of transformers that would bring down large portions of the U.S. electric grid. He continued the 
scenario assuming that portions of the electric grid were disabled.  When power is lost, customers 
with television, phone, and Internet services delivered over fiberoptic or coaxial cables will lose 
those services unless they have onsite backup power.  Additionally, the distribution nodes that 
connect homes and offices to the telephone or cable central office generally have battery power for 
only about 8-40 hours.  Many cellular towers will fail after 8-24 hours.  In other types of disasters, 
homes and businesses without power have lost their phone service and connection to the Internet 
in the first 24 hours, causing businesses and consumers to revert to a cash economy.  If power is 
not restored, the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) will begin to fail in impacted areas 
within approximately 3-7 days.  Satellite service providers that rely on the PSTN and the Internet 
may not be able to provide services to their customers.
He concluded by noting that if electric power remains available, even the worst predicted space 
weather event would be inconvenient, but not catastrophic for society. The actual impact of a 100- 
or 500-year storm on the electric power grid is hotly debated. It is unclear, at present, what the 
real impact will be. His recommendations are that we diversify. Redundant and resilient satellite, 
radio, and terrestrial communication systems can provide critical communications throughout a 
“super storm”. It is also important to have backup power available and to have a plan to mitigate 
the impact on people, particularly those needed to help restore the electric grid.
Following the presentation, the question was asked whether satellites could be knocked out sooner 
than in his scenario. He said that this question was difficult to answer because satellite providers 
are uncomfortable discussing their vulnerabilities. Someone noted that losing the electric grid 
could cause immediate harm to people, for example, to individuals in dialysis centers. He agreed 
and said that this kind of liability precisely describes the complexity that decision makers must 
face during a space weather event.
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IV.5 Impact of Ionospheric Scintillation on Commercial GNSS Timing 
Receivers
Dr. Joaquim Fortuny from the Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC) dis-
cussed the impact of ionospheric scintillation on commercial Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS) timing receivers. Critical infrastructures on the ground rely on GNSS-based services for 
precise timing and synchronization. IPSC is currently investigating the vulnerabilities of GNSS 
systems to both anthropogenic interference sources, such as digital video broadcasting and radio 
frequency interference, and natural interference systems such as space weather. The vulnerability 
of satellite navigation to space weather has been the topic of a number of studies, most recently 
the American Meteorological Society Report (March 2011). Some of the recommendations from 
previous studies are that GNSS should be classified as a critical infrastructure, GNSS receivers 
and antennas should be hardened, backup systems and standards for more resilient GNSS receiv-
ers should be established, and the impacts of interference on critical timing and synchronization 
services be quantified.
Space weather affects the accuracy of GPS by causing perturbations in the ionosphere. Ionospheric 
range delay results from normal signal propagation through the ionosphere. These effects are slow 
and correctable. Scintillations result from severe ionospheric signal scattering. These effects are 
fast, unpredictable, and hard to rectify. Amplitude fading or signal to noise degradation is also 
caused by solar radio bursts. Extensive tests were conducted on 7 different GPS clocks/time servers 
used in the telecom sector. It was found that the quality of the local oscillator determines the perfor-
mance of a GPS clock in case of a temporary outage or in the presence of radio frequency interfer-
ence. Work is continuing to test receivers under amplitude scintillation using signal generators. The 
overarching goal is to construct GPS servers and receivers that are more resilient to scintillation.
IV.6 Climatic Changes in Space Weather: Sustained Minima and  
Maxima in Solar Activity
Dr. Mike Hapgood, research scientist at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL), discussed climatic 
changes in space weather and sustained minima and maxima in solar activity with time. This was 
largely the work done by his colleagues Mike Lockwood, Luke Barnard, and Chris Davis in the 
Department of Meteorology at the University of Reading. He showed the striking anti-correlation 
of cosmic rays with Sunspot numbers. This occurs because greater solar activity correlates with 
solar wind activity, which in turn pushes out the coronal source flux to give a stronger heliospheric 
field that partially shields the Earth from cosmic rays. This is significant because cosmic rays pen-
etrate electronics causing single event effects and structural damage. Cosmic rays impact ground, 
aviation, and space systems. Estimates of cosmic ray abundance come from 14C and 10Be spallation 
products that get incorporated into the biomass and ice sheets rather quickly after creation by cos-
mic rays in reactions involving oxygen, nitrogen, and argon in the troposphere and stratosphere. 
These cosmogenic isotope abundances in terrestrial reservoirs correlate well with solar activity. 
Thus, cosmogenic isotopes give unique insight into solar variability on millennial timescales.
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Dr. Hapgood showed the millennial variation of the solar intensity for the last ~9000 years (see 
figure 5). This shows that the Sun has been unusually active over the last several decades. How-
ever, extrapolating the recent linear declines in the solar wind speed, magnetic field strength, and 
open solar flux, indicates that we are nearing the end of the latest grand maximum. All reasonable 
extrapolations show the next 50 years to be a period of reduced solar activity. This reduced solar 
activity will result in cosmic ray fluxes increasing in space and at aircraft cruise altitudes. Also, 
there is increasing probability of very large radiation storms, since they are often correlated with 
lower solar activity. The future projections of lower solar activity also may have implications for 
global climate change.
Figure 5. The millennial variation of the solar intensity, as inferred from cosmogenic isotopes, 
over the last 9000 years.
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V. Do We Need a Dedicated Space Weather Institute
V.1 NASA Heliophysics Research Program: Past, Present and Future
Dr. Madhulika Guhathakurta, of the Heliophysics Division at NASA Headquarters, discussed 
NASA’s heliophysics research program. Heliophysics is a rather new scientific discipline, which 
deals with the interaction of three forces—pressure, gravity, and magnetism. The underlying uni-
versal physical processes governing order and disorder are still not well understood, because the 
Sun is a variable magnetic star with many different temporal and spatial scales. Processes operat-
ing at one scale can influence phenomena at other scales. This is well illustrated in Figure 6, which 
shows some of the interacting components in this complex system. Several of NASA’s earliest 
scientific successes involved heliophysics, e.g., the discovery of the radiation belts by Explorer 1 
in 1958, and the detection of the solar wind by Mariner 3 in 1963. She discussed some of the ele-
ments of the Heliophysics Division (HPD) strategy. The HPD roadmap must be consistent with the 
National Research Council (NRC) Decadal Study (2003) and the NASA Science Mission Director-
ate strategic plan (2010). Two of the key elements in the heliophysics portfolio are the Explorers 
program and a competed Research and Analysis  (R&A) program. 
Figure 6. Some of the processes operating at different spatial and temporal scales on the Sun.
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At NASA, heliophysics is an integrated program involving data collection with an array of satel-
lites, a Community Coordinated Modeling Center (CCMC), and a theory program. Thus the NASA 
heliophysics program provides theory, data, and modeling development to support the national 
efforts in space weather. The five research satellites that provide most of the data in support of space 
weather are the Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE), the Solar and Heliophysics Observatory 
(SOHO), the two Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatories (STEREO), and the Solar Dynamics 
Observatory (SDO). These satellites can observe active regions, flares, and coronal mass ejections 
around the full circumference of the Sun. 
Education of the next generation of solar physicists is another aspect of the heliophysics program 
at NASA. She mentioned the outstanding series of three volumes on heliophysics edited by Karl 
Schrijver and George Siscoe (an outgrowth of the Living With a Star (LWS) summer school series). 
NASA also has a Heliophysics Postdoctoral Fellowship program, now the Eddy Fellowship pro-
gram in honor of John Eddy, who was an early pioneer best known for his work in recovering the 
history of the Sun. To inform the public about what is happening on the Sun, the NASA heliophys-
ics division has developed the 3D Sun App, which can be downloaded for free to either the iPhone 
or iPad.
Dr. Guhathakurta ended her presentation talking about the future of heliophysics. She noted that 
accurate forecasts of space weather would become increasingly important as humans extend their 
presence into the solar system. Advancing the reach of space weather throughout the solar system 
will require advances in theory, observations, and computing power. She discussed the possible 
formation of an interplanetary space weather institute. Her vision was an institute modeled after the 
Astrobiology Institute that would bring an interdisciplinary consortium of experts scattered across 
many universities and agencies under a virtual NASA umbrella.
A question was asked about the prospects for developing an integrated ground and space-based 
observational program of the Sun. She declined to comment, since the ground-based program was 
under the purview of the National Science Foundation (NSF). A second question related to protect-
ing astronauts from space weather and whether the new Human Exploration and Operations (HEO) 
mission directorate at NASA was addressing it. She indicated that discussions with HEO on this 
subject had been initiated.
V.2 Severe Space Weather and the National Response Framework
Dr. Ron Turner, ANSER Fellow at Analytic Services, Inc., discussed the National Response Frame-
work for responding to severe space weather. In the event of a space weather event of national 
scope and impact, there is a structure responsible for coordinating the response among local, state, 
and federal government agencies. The main role of the space weather community will be to pro-
vide alerts, warnings, and general space situation awareness to the decision makers. The landscape 
is complex, as it involves not only the federal, state and local governments, but the public, media, 
academia, the private sector, as well as issues around critical infrastructure. Key federal guidance 
documents are Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) on management of domestic 
incidents and critical infrastructure identification, prioritization, and protection, and the Presiden-
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Figure 7. The principal steps required for the preparation and implementation of the national 
response to space weather.
tial Policy Directive on national preparedness. These directives establish a single comprehensive 
National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a systematic, proactive approach 
to guide departments and agencies to work together to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover 
from, and mitigate the effects of incidents. The NIMS is distinct from the National Response Frame-
work (NRF), which provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident 
management. The Catastrophic Incident Annex to the NRF (NRF-CIA) establishes the context and 
overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response 
to a catastrophic incident.
In the event of a major space weather event, the President will lead the response. The FEMA admin-
istrator is the principal advisor to the President. NOAA, USAF, NASA and critical infrastructure 
subject matter experts will be the principal advisors to FEMA. Figure 7 shows the principal steps 
required for the preparation and implementation of the national response. The first step in the prepa-
ration is to obtain national consensus on the impacts of a severe space weather event. Considering 
the on-going debate on the vulnerability of the electric grid to space weather effects, the space 
weather community has yet to achieve this national consensus. This significantly complicates form-
ing response plans across all impacted sectors.
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Dr. Turner noted that communication is a critical component of the response. In the case of an 
impending storm, NOAA/SWPC will issue progressively more urgent alerts and the federal response 
network will be alerted, but not implemented. It is important that the space weather community 
deliver a coordinated and consistent message using all available public media to appropriately com-
municate the risk. Once the storm is imminent, the White House will convene the National Security 
Council and crisis management teams will be initiated. The outcome of the response is uncertain, 
because our increasingly complex infrastructure has yet to experience a severe space weather event.
In the comments following the presentation, the need for a single voice from the space commu-
nity to provide advice in a major space weather event was stressed. In the UK they have a single 
“go to” authority to provide advice.  As its sole source of authoritative advice, FEMA uses the 
NOAA/SWPC. It was also noted that under the 10th amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that the 
general welfare of the people are the providence of the state. FEMA acts in support of the states 
in case of an emergency. The states use the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
(THIRA) tool in assessing the threat. One of the actions of the meeting was to provide a statement 
on the societal risks of space weather to be included in the National Preparedness Report (NPR).
V.3 Space Weather Services at NASA GSFC Space Weather Lab
Dr. Masha Kuznetsova of NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) gave an overview of GSFC 
space weather services. The two main pillars of this service are the Community Coordinated Mod-
eling Center (CCMC) in operation since 2000 and the Integrated Space Weather Analysis System 
(iSWA) in operation from 2009. The CCMC hosts a broad range of most advanced space weather 
models, provide modeling, visualization, and model output analysis services to the research com-
munity, and serve as a tool by which research models are transitioned to operations. The iSWA is 
focused on collecting data and model outputs from diverse sources to create custom space weather 
products data for dissemination to customers. These web-based tools are available worldwide from 
the GSFC web sites (http://ccmc.gsfc.nasa.gov and http://iswa.gsfc.nasa.gov). The CCMC tests and 
evaluates modes, designs real-time modeling systems, leads and supports community-wide metrics 
challenges, and supports operational space weather models selection. The iSWA is a user-configu-
rable web-based system for analyzing space weather. The web site contains modeling results and 
comprehensive sets of observational data ready to be used by space weather forecasters. Examples 
of space weather tools out of more than 300 products include CME, flare and SEP forecasting, 
heliospheric tomography models, global magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) models of the Earth’s 
magnetosphere, radiation belt modeling, and ionospheric models.
The Solar Shield project at the space weather lab is a partnership with EPRI for the development of 
an innovative GIC forecast system. The goal is to provide level 1 forecasts with lead times of 1-2 
days, and level 2 forecasts with lead times of 30-60 minutes. Other functions of the space weath-
er services are to provide assistance in spacecraft anomaly resolution and weekly space weather 
reports and alerts regarding adverse conditions throughout the solar system to NASA mission oper-
ators. A series of examples were given demonstrating CME forecasting. She closed by reiterating 
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that GSFC has developed a world-leading information collection and public dissemination system, 
which supports NASA missions and other interests such as the electric power grid. Furthermore, 
there is still additional potential to address national space weather needs in innovative, collabora-
tive, and cost-effective ways.
V.4 Plenary Panel Discussion: Do We Need a Dedicated Institute for 
Societal Impacts of Space Weather and If So, Why?
One of the key focuses of the workshop was to evaluate the need for an institute that would address 
specifically the societal impacts of space weather. To kick off this discussion, we held a plenary 
panel discussion on the need for such an institute in the morning of the second day. The panel 
consisted of the following subject matter experts: Drs. Karel Schrijver, Mike Hapgood, Louis Lan-
zerotti, Alan Title, and Tom Bogdan. Each panel member was allowed a few minutes for opening 
remarks. 
Karel Schrijver’s comments focused on the need to quantify the risks, likelihood, and cost of space 
weather to society. Without this assessment it is impossible to develop a business case for building 
resilience. He made the analogy with Earthquake preparedness, where we have a better assessment 
on the potential impacts to society. An institute could provide a mechanism for bringing together 
the wide range of expertise necessary to make the business case. 
Mike Hapgood felt a key function of the institute could be to improve communication. A dedicated 
Society and Space Weather Institute (SSWI) could bring together the disparate expertise necessary 
to break down the barriers to transforming what we know about the physics to those that need this 
knowledge to make policy decisions. It could help break down barriers to getting private and public 
organizations to work together, and would provide a conduit for international collaboration that is 
especially important considering the potentially very large geographical footprint of a major space 
weather event.
Louis Lanzerotti discussed the straw man concept paper for a Society and Space Weather Institute 
(SSWI) that was handed out at the end of the first day of the workshop. The paper presented a 
concept for an international organization to transform our knowledge of space weather into options 
for protecting society. He noted that the marketplace says a lot about what is needed for disaster 
response. We need to know how much money the commercial sector is spending on space weather, 
before we can make decisions on the breakdown of how a SSWI is funded between government 
(NASA, NSF, DOE, DOD) and industrial partners. He also raised the question of how we narrow 
down the mission of the SSWI. Would it just be another academic exercise? Would it be allowed 
to grow and compete for R&A funds from NASA and NSF, thereby becoming too competitive for 
the taxpayer? Although he felt that the concept paper had merit, he thought we needed to think hard 
about the role of government and the commercial sector in a SSWI.
Alan Title, reflecting on Jim Spann’s presentation in section (II.1), noted that most scientists don’t 
have the time or inclination to interact well with operational people. An organization is needed to 
establish an interface to bring scientists together in an environment that encourages dialogue with 
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people whose job it is to protect society, to develop products, and to deliver functions. Ultimately, 
state and local governments are going to have make decisions. It is difficult to believe that a set of 
NOAA alerts is going to influence a state governor to tell power companies to turn off their power. 
There have to be trusted employees rather high up in the organization that can make these decisions. 
A significant role of the SSWI would be to develop a core of people that fit in these interfaces and 
provide respected advice.
Tom Bogdan began by noting the product of vulnerability x exposure x risk of probability sets 
the cost/benefit ratio. The amount of additional resources required to fund the SSWI is minuscule 
compared with the potential cost of a space weather event. However, until we quantify that cost/
benefit ratio in a manner that can be understood and appreciated as being valid by non-space sci-
entists, we are not going to make progress. The draft document of the SSWI, which is innovative, 
inspired, and imperative, provides a means of how we might compute the cost/benefit ratio along 
with the uncertainties. There is another theme of three I’s that relate to the institute—Interdisciplin-
ary, International, and Independent. Space weather is an extremely interdisciplinary and interna-
tional problem. As a government organization, NOAA has significant constraints on dealing with 
international partners. The organization must be independent to bring our international partners in 
fully, and to provide independent and unbiased advice to policymakers. Although there are many 
other problems, such as how to transition to operations and what are the roles of commercial enti-
ties, these should not distract the institute from focusing on the one problem that it can best solve, 
namely, computing the cost/benefit ratio.
Question: What is the sense of urgency, especially considering other competing issues and the 
severe budget constraints?
Answer: Considering the consequences of taking out the energy grid for an extended period of 
time, a small additional investment is the morally and economically imperative thing to do. 
Comment: Perhaps we could augment the NOAA/SWPC budget to address issues like these.
Question: Who would be the target audience and who would be initial sponsors for getting the 
institute started?
Answer: We have already made the business case, since we currently have the attention of the 
President, the Prime Minister of the UK, business leaders, and other key scientific advisors.
Question: What analogous issues have come with other institutes?
Answer: We need greater industry involvement in the institute. Independence from government is 
important for European countries to be involved.
Question: What are the objectives of the institute and how are they different from other space 
weather entities?
Answer: The institute should focus on one thing—computing the cost/benefit ratio. Selection of 
the work of the institute should be based on a peer-review process. Another function of the institute 
should be education.
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Question/Comment: How do you envision assembling a staff that could span the disciplines 
required to solve the problem? One model would be to use scientists funded by other institutions 
from which you would elicit in-kind contributions. This would provide an affordable approach to 
obtaining contributions across the full range of national expertise. The institute would have to be 
independent to get wide endorsement from industry. The National Research Council is a successful 
model that uses in-kind contribution.
Answer: That is exactly our concept. My hope is that a couple of people at this meeting would 
volunteer to sit on a task group to define one of these problem areas. They would draft a document 
that raises these concerns and include how much it might cost to mitigate the problems.  
Comment: There are a number of virtual institutes within NASA such as the Astrobiology Insti-
tute that have been extremely successful and have been a great model for international collabora-
tion. You can set up nodes around the country and run the institute with a very small core of people.
Comment: The word policy should be added to the SSWI draft. I don’t agree that we have a politi-
cal will to launch a new institute—we are not even able to make the advocacy for replacing ACE.
Answer: Getting the political will depends on making the business case. The potential roles of the 
SSWI were contrasted with the International Space Science Institute (ISSI), a nonprofit organiza-
tion in Bern, Switzerland. ISSI is an institute for advanced studies where scientists meet in a multi- 
and interdisciplinary setting to establish the state-of-the-art of various scientific disciplines.  ISSI 
publishes books that are the output of workshops. 
Final comments of the panel: Keep people talking. Volunteer to be on a task group that works 
on one of these problems. We have a window of opportunity that will soon close.
V.5 How does Space Weather Research fit into the UK Strategic Program?
Dr. John Rees of the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) in the UK discussed how 
space weather research fits into the UK strategic program, and how the UK could contribute to 
research in a dedicated SSWI. He noted that the interest in space weather has been increasing in the 
UK, as evidenced by the establishment of a space environment impact group of experts to advise 
the government on worst case scenario planning for the UK national risk assessment. In the UK 
there is a strong focus on impacts and mitigation techniques. He agreed with earlier comments 
made by Dr. Tom Bogdan that given the increased societal and political interest in space weather, 
now is the opportune time to consider the formation of a dedicated SSWI.
Dr. Rees discussed the solar-terrestrial physics that is being carried out in NERC and in the Science 
and Technology Facilities Council (STFC) in the UK. NERC is responsible for all Earth oriented 
solar-terrestrial physics, whereas STFC is responsible for space-based facilities and solar-terrestrial 
physics. He also discussed briefly the U.S.-UK collaborations in space weather led by Rutherford 
Appleton Laboratory (RAL). Dr. Rees discussed options for UK contributions to a dedicated SSWI. 
Research interests at NERC, such as the coupling of energy, momentum, and chemistry between 
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the mesosphere, stratosphere, and thermosphere, and on weather, climate, and ground-based hazard 
impacts, would fit well within a dedicated SSWI. He discussed options for collaborative research 
programs and noted that a virtual institute would be an ideal structure to foster collaboration. Mech-
anisms for research collaboration need to be explored, and consideration should be given to how 
a collaborative initiative between the U.S. and UK would be most effectively developed within a 
dedicated SSWI.
In the subsequent discussion it was noted that if staffing of the institute were under a virtual model, 
it would be easier to see how European partners could contribute, although potential European 
partners might have to use different business models to sell the concept to their governments. The 
speaker concurred with these comments.
V.6 The National Space Weather Program
Mr. Michael Bonadonna, Executive Secretary of the National Space Weather Program (NSWP) 
Council, discussed the strategic goals, organization, vision, and activities of the NSWP. The mis-
sion of NSWP is to serve as the focal point for the Federal government’s national space weather 
enterprise and partnerships. By providing an active synergistic, interagency forum for collabora-
tion, the NSWP facilitates mutually beneficial interactions among the Nation’s research and opera-
tional communities.  The vision for NSWP is a Nation that capitalizes on advances in science and 
forecasting to better cope with the adverse impacts of space weather on human activity and on 
advanced technologies.  
Key goals of NSWP include understanding the physical conditions and processes that produce 
space weather, developing and sustaining necessary observational capabilities, providing tailored 
and accurate space weather information, raising national awareness of space weather impacts, and 
fostering communication among government, commercial, and academic organizations. A program 
council that contains many member agencies, including NOAA, NASA, NSF, and Homeland Secu-
rity, runs the NSWP. The capabilities, strategies, goals, research, etc. are laid out in the 2000 NSWP 
implementation plan that can be downloaded from the following website:
http://www.ofcm.gov/nswp-ip/tableofcontents.htm. One of the key functions of NSWP is to pro-
vide reports for the Executive Office of the President and the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP). The most recent report by the NSWP was on the current and planned space 
weather observing systems. The NSWP has also partnered with the National Science and Tech-
nology Council’s subcommittee on disaster reduction to publish the “grand challenges for space 
weather”. Another function of the NSWP is to host forums on space weather, such as the 2011 
forum in Washington DC entitled “Solar Maximum: Can we Weather the Storm?” In the year 
ahead, the NSWP is focused on publishing an action plan and an updated implementation plan. 
In the discussion following, it was noted that while NSWP would be supportive of a SSWI, they 
would not be able to contribute to its funding.
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V.7 UK Resilience and the Role of Scientific Advice in Emergencies
Anita Friend of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat discussed UK resilience and the role of scien-
tific advice in emergencies. The resilience planning cycle in the UK is a holistic process that begins 
by identifying and assessing the risks. Once the risks are identified, strategies for mitigating both 
the likelihood of risks occurring and their impact are identified and these approaches evaluated. 
Civil emergency risks are assessed against three time horizons (over 5 years to inform contingency 
planning and capability building, over the longer term to provide strategic foresight and over the 
next 6 months to allow specific emergencies to be anticipated). The National Risk Assessment 
(NRA) identifies and assesses civil emergency risks to inform capability planning and capability 
building to mitigate the impacts of emergencies, if they occur.  The importance of a generic risk 
depends both on its relative impact (limited to catastrophic) and the relative likelihood of the event. 
The NRA therefore assesses the likelihood and impact of reasonable worst-case scenario (the worst 
manifestation of the risk if implausible scenarios are removed) for each generic risk. These assess-
ments inform planning decisions with the highest priority given to likely and catastrophic risks. 
Preparations for responding to emergencies when they occur are on the whole focused on managing 
the common consequences of a range of risks. More intensive, specific planning is reserved for the 
highest priority risks.  Input by subject matter experts from the intelligence, scientific, economic, 
and policy-making communities feed into the NRA assessments. Because of the consequence-
focused approach to preparing for emergencies, it is important to know what emergencies (such as 
severe space weather) would look like if they occurred, including societal impacts and the scale of 
impacts. 
Dr. Chris McFee continued by discussing how scientists fit into the risk assessment and planning 
process. The planning process involves a chief scientific advisor in each government department 
and science advisory committees and groups. The Space Environmental Impacts Experts group pro-
vides subject matter experts for space weather. In the case of an emergency, a meeting in the Cabinet 
Office Briefing Room (COBR) is called, which is chaired by the Prime Minister if the emergency is 
serious. This group is responsible for formulating an operational response. Science providers give 
input through the UK Chief Scientific Adviser (currently John Beddington). He showed how this 
process played out for the recent nuclear disaster event in Japan. He closed by discussing efforts to 
create timelines to guide the response process.
In the discussion period following these two presentations, it was noted that FEMA was working 
on timelines also, and that response protocols had been established between FEMA and NOAA that 
depend on the projected intensity of the space weather event. The question was asked whether there 
was a consistent policy on how different departments perform their risk analysis. The response 
was that similar expertise and criteria for assessment was brought to each risk assessment. It was 
asked how warnings go out to local planners in the UK? The answer was that a briefing tool was 
used to provide information on emerging situations. This draws on evidence collated from a range 
of sources? It was asked whether the UK was continuing to update the assessment of the electric 
power grid. The response was that this is part of the overall risk assessment that was being updated 
annually. A final question was about the aging satellite fleet and the possibility of losing critical 
observations of solar events. The response was that they were aware of the risk, but a business case 
would have to be made before any mitigation of the problem could be attempted given the limited 
resources available.
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V.8 Space Weather and the NSO Synoptic Program
Dr. Mark Giampapa, Deputy Director of the National Solar Observatory (NSO), discussed the 
space weather related activities at NSO, which is funded by NSF and managed under a cooperative 
agreement by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy. NSO currently operates 
long-term observing networks at the Kitt Peak National Observatory near Tucson, and the Sacra-
mento Peak Observatory in New Mexico. A major new NSO initiative is the 4-meter Advanced 
Technology Solar Telescope that will begin construction soon at Haleakala in Maui. The NSO Syn-
optic Program that is most relevant to space weather is comprised of two major facilities, the Solar 
Long-Term Investigations of the Sun (SOLIS) and the Global Oscillation Network Group (GONG). 
SOLIS has a suite of instruments located at Kitt Peak. The most important instrument is the Vec-
tor SpectroMagnetograph (VSM), which provides daily 2k by 2k full disk vector and longitudinal 
magnetograms in the photosphere and chromosphere of the Sun. The GONG network consists of 
six sites geographically distributed to provide continuous viewing of the Sun. The principal data 
product of GONG is full disk 1k by 1k Doppler images every minute to support helioseismology 
studies that provide for far-side imaging of the Sun. The GONG far-side maps are used by NOAA/
SWPC for long-range forecasts. The GONG Hα images are used by the U.S. Air Force Weather 
Agency for operational nowcasting of space weather conditions. Dr. Giampapa also discussed the 
possibility of predicting flares through helioseismology.
Dr. Giampapa ended his presentation by talking about work done at NSO to look at the mean mag-
netic strengths of the Sun as a function of time (see figure 8). The data that extend to the beginning 
of cycle 24 show a clear decline in the maximum field strength with time. Various extrapolations are 
shown, the most accurate being the solid line that includes the cycle 24 data. Once the magnetic field 
strength passes below about 1500 gauss, the Sunspots will fade into the photosphere. If the extrapo-
lations are accurate, Sunspot activity will be close to zero in the 2020-2025 timeframe. A question 
was asked if we are enter-
ing into another grand 
minimum similar to the 
Maunder Minimum in the 
17th century? He replied 
that this is one possibil-
ity, but this would not 
eliminate the possibility 
of a major geomagnetic 
storm, because geomag-
netic activity continues 
even in the absence of 
Sunspots. Another ques-
tion was whether all of the 
data being taken by NSO 
was being fully analyzed. 
He said that efforts were 
underway to better exploit 
the data by improving the 
modeling.
Figure 8. The mean magnetic strength of sunspot umbrae 
extrapolated out to the year 2025.
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VI. How Would an Institute Function Most Usefully  
and Economically?
VI.1 Plenary Panel Discussion: What Functions Should an International 
Weather Institute Have?
The second panel discussion focused on what are the appropriate functions and business models 
for a dedicated space weather organization (referred to here as a Society and Space Weather Insti-
tute (SSWI)). To set the stage, it is worth noting that some of the goals identified in the straw man 
concept paper were presented to the workshop participants at the end of the first day. Some of the 
potential roles for the institute that were identified in the concept paper include: (1) integrating and 
evaluating knowledge of space-weather phenomena and consequences; (2) developing moderate-
event and extreme-event scenarios with realistic analysis-based impacts; (3) providing evaluations 
of space-weather impacts on new technological applications; (4) interfacing with scientists, fore-
casters, and leaders in government and society in emergency planning and preparedness, in policy 
development, and in international coordination; and (5) developing educational and informational 
materials and courses for scientists, societal leadership, emergency responders, media, and the public. 
The principal goal of this panel discussion was to engage the workshop participants in further defin-
ing these goals. The panel consisted of the following subject matter experts: Drs. Karel Schrijver, 
Mike Hapgood, James Head, Alan Title, John Kappenman, and Madhulika Guhathakurta.
In opening remarks, Karel Schrijver indicated that education would certainly be a key function of 
the institute, but how far an institute might delve into policy was still uncertain.  Mike Hapgood 
noted that the international aspect of the institute was important considering the global extent of 
space weather. While he felt that an institute would focus on the big picture, this would not preclude 
customization—e.g., customizing a response for a large continent like the U.S. versus an island sur-
rounded by ocean like the UK. James Head indentified potential roles of an institute as science or 
generating new knowledge, education, policy analysis, and policy advocacy. He contrasted policy 
advocacy and lobbying. Alan Title stressed one of the major themes emerging from the workshop. 
The function of the institute should be foremost “to establish that the space weather threat is real.” 
We have not yet established this, and we must do so before we can make any further progress in mit-
igating the threat. John Kappenman spoke about the threat analyses that he has done for the electric 
grids of several countries. In his opinion, considerable vulnerability exists in all of the electric grids 
he has analyzed. He feels that electric grid operators as well as satellite operators are in denial of 
the risks, in part because they are reluctant to talk about their vulnerabilities. We received a warning 
from the 1989 event, but we believe that storms an order of magnitude larger are possible. Consid-
ering the downside risk, such as losing power to nuclear plants, the situation is untenable. Madhu-
lika Guhathakurta stressed the need for succinctly defining the role of the proposed new institute 
and explaining how its role is distinct from existing organizations that deal with space weather.
Question: Considering the need for the institute to establish a policy, how do we keep the institute 
from becoming partisan, which could reduce its credibility?
Answer: This is a problem for any scientist entering the policy realm. You can be accused of being 
partisan just because someone disagrees with you.  Opinions vary on whether non-governmental 
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Organizations (NGOs) should be involved in policy. Climate gate is an important lesson for us—it 
shows that presentation of an issue is important. We need to create an institute that can convince 
industry that they must look at the downside risk. There is serious debate in the electric industry as 
to whether transformers can be damaged by GICs.
Comment: I am concerned that forming a “new” organization is going to be perceived as an 
attack on people’s budget. However, if we said that we are already spending a lot of money on this 
issue and that the institute will provide a more efficient means of doing this research, it might be 
perceived much more favorably.
Comment: We should ask the question “who would care if we were successful in documenting 
the hazards of space weather?” Will industry cooperate and will they help finance it? We now spend 
about 750 million per year on scientific studies related to heliophysics and space weather. Justifi-
cation for these expenditures is based in part on the societal benefits of the research. What is the 
business case for industry to participate? The one incentive that industry does respond to is busi-
ness development. There may be business in this for them. For example, we don’t have an adequate 
space monitoring system. We need constellations of satellites to provide adequate warning from 
space weather. We would need to spend approximately 200 million/year on infrastructure invest-
ment to build an adequate system. 
Comment: We have to be careful when selling the impact of various scenarios of space weather 
on the electric grid. When you start talking about the specifics of how many transformers might 
fail, we simply do not have reliable information. The electric industry realizes the inadequacy of 
their models, but they are working with EPRI to improve the models and to better assess the vulner-
abilities in their systems.
Comment: I would like to approach the problem from the standpoint of a customer. This year the 
White House tasked FEMA with providing the Federal interagency response plan to space weather. 
We have had difficulty getting this off the ground, because we cannot even agree on a scenario. To 
develop a scenario we need to know the impacts, and without the impacts we cannot do the risk 
assessment. We need models based on sound science that are accepted by the community.
Comment: We need spacecraft to get space weather data. The community needs new and innova-
tive ways to ensure a continuing stream of space weather data.
Comment: Back to the question of how to avoid partisanship. Global climate change is probably 
not a good analogy for space weather, because the issue is skewed by the coal and gas industry that 
has a vested financial interest. However, everyone is completely dependent on GPS, satellites, elec-
tricity, etc. We need to emphasize that everyone has a common interest when we try to find funding 
for the SSWI.
Comment/Question: A theme that I keep hearing is that a lot of work is being done on space 
weather and many agencies are involved.  Perhaps we can package this as a better way of organiz-
ing our portfolio of space weather. Does it make sense to ask for 2 million to initiate this institute 
when we are spending 750 million already? What can we do to redirect funds so that we can fund 
the institute? This is an especially good idea if we have a very narrow scope for the institute. 
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Comment: Because we are coming from a physics base there is no tradition of supporting a path-
way into which the research moves towards some stakeholder. What is the motivation for business? 
One motivation is compliance with design codes. By law industry is required to meet various codes 
and environmental requirements. The self-regulated electric companies do not have code require-
ments that address issues with space weather.
Comment: We should make every effort to get more out of our space data by using advanced IT 
technologies.
VI.2 Plenary Panel Discussion: What are the Possible Business  
Models for the Institute?
The third panel discussion focused on possible business models for a dedicated space weather insti-
tute. To initiate the session, Dr. Carl Pilcher, Director of the NASA Astrobiology Institute (NAI) 
and session chair provided an overview of the NAI, one of the most successful virtual institutes 
in NASA. He felt that some of the advantages of a virtual institute would be applicable to the 
proposed SSWI. The virtual model is extremely good at two things—bringing people together 
seamlessly who would not otherwise come together, and secondly, bridging geographical bounds. 
The NAI is very interdisciplinary, promoting collaboration between many scientific disciplines, 
such as astronomy, geology, paleontology, planetary and Earth science, etc. The NAI consists of 
14 competitively selected science teams, each a consortium. It includes ~600 members at ~150 
participating institutions. International partners are either associate or affiliate members. The NAI 
mission contains five elements—collaborative interdisciplinary research, providing leadership in 
NASA science missions, information technology research, training the next generation of astrobi-
ologists, and education and outreach. The NAI has a yearly budget of ~25 million dollars, the vast 
bulk of which goes out to the scientific community. A participant commented that he liked the NAI 
approach because it is very inclusive.
Comment: We have consensus that the effects of space weather are real, and considering the 
dire consequences, we must do something about it. Exception was taken to earlier statements that 
the majority of spacecraft would survive. He estimated that half of the satellites would be lost to a 
Carrington-scale event because of surface charging.
Comment: The NAI was able to get started with strong advocacy from NASA senior management. 
This is not our situation—who in government has the responsibility for space weather? While we 
spend something like 750 million dollars on space science research, these funds are highly commit-
ted. We need to find someone to provide funding for a demonstration project that could eventually 
lead to a long-term program with government funding. In the current environment, we are going to 
have to demonstrate the value of a SSWI before we are going to be able to find substantial funding. 
Comment: It was stressed that we are far more susceptible to space weather now with all of our 
technological advances.
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Comment: Two UK efficiency initiatives were discussed, the first involving flooding and the sec-
ond involving international disaster risk reduction. Both agendas have many players involved. Until 
recently these efforts were very fragmented, but now they have developed a joint strategy about not 
just the science needs but observational requirements as well. This new effort is viewed as evolu-
tionary, because all the partners are talking and working together, but retaining their independence. 
Perhaps a collaborative model like this could be usefully applied to the SSWI.
Comment: One way to reallocate funds is to work with institutions that have funding to see 
whether these new efforts could be put into their strategic plans. Reallocation of funds would hinge 
on making the economic rational for these new studies.
Comment: Another model that was suggested as a possible template was the NASA Human Health 
and Performance Center (NHHPC), which connects organizations interested in advancing human 
health and performance innovations. There are ~100 widely different organizations involved in this 
virtual organization, which has a relatively small budget on the order of 200,000 dollars.
Comment: We have a serious credibility problem. Outside our community, we do not have con-
sensus that space weather is a serious threat. Using NRC sponsored workshops as an example, we 
could perhaps convince the Office of Space and Technology Program (OSTP) to fund a pilot study 
to better define the risks and impacts of space weather.
Comment: Space-related international governance models currently in use as compiled by the 
U.S. Department of State were shown. The Planetary Science Institute, a research institute based 
in Tucson, Arizona focusing on planetary science, was suggested as another model that we should 
consider as a template for the SSWI.
Comment: When presenting a business case for the institute to decision makers in Washington, 
we should include an example from an operational product that provides real time guidance on 
space weather effects, such as the reliability of GPS. This demonstrates that space weather is real 
and that we have the ability to put together operational systems to at least mitigate the impacts of 
space weather.
Comment: Perhaps we should NOT try to find funding for the institute by reallocating existing 
research funds, but go after new money. 
Comment: I am involved in preparing the state of Alaska for natural disasters. I am prepared to 
deliver to all of my counterparts in all 50 states a 300-500 word concise statement of the threats 
of space weather. However, we must act now to get space weather recognized as a credible threat 
before the National Preparedness Report (NPR) goes to the President on March 31st. If you formu-
late concisely the consequences of space weather, we can get it to the decision makers. 
Discussion: We have such a concise statement on the OSTP website. A cogent statement of the 
effects of space weather exists on the web at (http://www/sdr/gov). It is part of the Grand Challenges 
for Disaster Reduction, which is a ten-year strategy crafted by the National Science and Technology 
Council’s Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction (SDR). We must incorporate a statement on space 
weather in the NPR if we want it to be taken seriously by the states. It was emphasized previously 
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that the states have primary responsibility to respond to natural disasters in their states. Discus-
sion continued on how to write a short cogent statement of the impacts and consequences of space 
weather in the near future so that it will be incorporated into the NPR before it goes to the President. 
This was one of the actions coming out of the workshop.
VI.3 Discussion: Priorities—Where do we go from here?
The final session of the workshop focused on actions and strategy for continuing the momentum of 
the workshop. The panel consisted of four of the workshop sponsors: Drs. Pete Worden (NASA), 
Ken Washington (LMATC), Mike Hapgood (RAL Space), and Tom Bogdan (NOAA). Pete Worden 
began by raising four questions. First, is a dedicated space weather institute really needed? A show 
of hands indicated that a significant majority of the workshop participants thought it was needed. A 
few participants were still undecided. Secondly, what is the problem? We need to develop a coher-
ent statement of the problem that everyone can agree on. Third, there appear to be some near-term 
opportunities, such as identifying space weather as a threat in the next version of the National Pre-
paredness Report (NPR) that will be delivered to the President by March 31st. We need to prepare 
a succinct and authoritative statement of the risk to be incorporated into this report. Finally, where 
does the funding for the new institute come from? Pete Worden was willing to pursue NASA as one 
of the contributors. We need to leave the workshop with people willing to work on answering these 
questions.
Ken Washington discussed the roles of LMATC in providing solar research and being a thought 
leader in heliophysics. LM builds instruments that acquire space weather data, they do analysis on 
the data, they publish journal papers and books on the science, and they engage in dialogue with the 
international community. To help ensure a continued stream of funding for solar physics, he funded 
the straw man concept paper (SSWI) that outlined what a dedicated institute might do and how it 
might be organized and funded. He felt that we currently do not speak with a common voice. He 
concurred with Dr. Worden that we need to pull a cogent statement of the problem together to be 
used for the NPR or other risk preparation documents. A key issue is how to get the institute started 
in the current budget environment. How do you give the community a sense of urgency consider-
ing that space weather is a low-probability, high-risk event? We need the right kind of advocacy 
to make this happen and we do not yet have that advocacy. However, he was committed to finding 
a way to push the institute concept forward, considering the large downside risk of a major space 
weather storm. 
Tom Bogdan stated that the threat of space weather is real. It is not a question of “if”, but a question 
of “when”. The most important thing we can do as a community is to quantify “when”. The institute 
provides a pathway to answer this question, but it may not be the only way. Our chance of finding 
funds for this activity is more likely to come from outside our community. We cannot be satisfied 
with the status quo. Many of the calamities that have occurred in the recent past have come from 
our lack of preparation. I don’t want space weather to be one of those areas where a calamity of epic 
proportions has to occur before we get the funds needed to protect our critical infrastructure. Once 
we know “when,” we will know how much we have to spend to buy down the risk. 
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Mike Hapgood stated that the most important thing the community can do is to quantify the risk. 
We have to build a case to convince policymakers and industry leaders who do not want to believe 
that the risk is in fact real. It is largely a question of diplomacy. He cautioned the community to 
not be too prescriptive about the solution. For example, the engineers may want to harden systems 
while scientists want to issue warnings. He disagreed with Tom Bogdan that it was just a question 
of “when”. The problem needs to be in terms of a probability distribution. Even if the probability of 
a catastrophic space weather event is only 1/1000 of happening in any given year, the impact is still 
too large to not mitigate the risk.
Question: Are there specific actions that the group wants to see emerge from the workshop? If 
so, how are they going to be defined, what are they, and who is going to take these actions? For 
example, a succinct statement of the risks of space weather should be written for inclusion in the 
National Preparedness Report. A list was created with names of participants willing to work on 
these actions. It was agreed that there would be a core group of individuals that would take the lead 
supported by the volunteers. It was suggested that we formulate a 1- or 2-year plan with milestones 
to guide this activity.
Question: Do we all agree that space weather is a credible threat? Based on a show of hands, it 
was demonstrated that we had consensus of the participants in attendance. However, while every-
one agrees that space weather is a credible threat, the nature of that threat requires further clarifi-
cation. What are our near-term targets of opportunity to further define the risk? There is reason to 
believe that there is negotiating space in our existing portfolio of research to find funds to support a 
focused research project to better define the risks and impacts of space weather.
Question: What is it that gives the institute credibility? To make it credible you need the authority 
from those that are recognized as experts. Some kind of international peer review might be war-
ranted. The institute might also gain from having several well-respected supporting organizations 
such as NASA, NOAA, and NSF. Another important consideration is that the institute be indepen-
dent so as not to be perceived as biased.
Question: I am concerned with configuration control. How are we going to move forward? Could 
you provide some guidance as to what you require from the volunteer group? Also, there are others 
that did not attend this meeting that could help us move forward.
Question: Is it ground based or space based infrastructure that is more at risk? It is difficult to say 
considering the interdependencies of the infrastructures. Technological advances have made our 
infrastructure much more vulnerable to space weather. Because of this increased complexity and 
interconnectedness, our energy, finance, communication, and transportation systems are all at risk 
during a space weather event.
The workshop closed with a commitment to continue working together to better define the societal 
impacts and risks of space weather.
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
AAAS American Association for the Advancement of Science 
ACE Advanced Composition Explorer satellite
ARC Ames Research Center
CCMC Community Coordinated Modeling Center
CIA Catastrophic Incident Annex
CIR Co-rotating Interaction Region
CISM Center for Integrated Space Weather Modeling
CME Coronal Mass Ejection
COBR Cabinet Office Briefing Room
dB/dt Time variation of the magnetic field
DOD Department of Defense
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
ESDs Electrostatic Discharges
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Administration
GeV Gigaelectron volts
GIC Geo-magnetically Induced Current
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GONG Global Oscillation Network Group
GPS Global Positioning Systems
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
HEOMD Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate
HF high frequency
HPD Heliophysics Division
HSPDs Homeland Security Presidential Directives
ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection
IGS International GNSS Service
IPSC Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen
ISSI International Space Science Institute
iSWA Integrated Space Weather Analysis System
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
KeV Kiloelectron Volts
LaRC Langley Research Center
LEO Low-Earth Orbit
LMATC Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Center
LPV Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance
LWS Living With a Star
L1 Lagrange point between the Sun and Earth
MeV Megaelectron Volts
MHD Magnetohydrodynamics
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
NAI NASA Astrobiology Institute
NAIRAS Nowcast of Atmospheric Ionizing Radiation for Aviation Safety
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NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NERC Natural Environment Research Council
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System
NGO Non-Government Organization
NHHPC  NASA Human Health and Performance Center
NIMS National Incident Management System
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NPR National Preparedness Report
NRA National Risk Assessment
NRC National Research Council
NRF National Response Framework
NSF National Science Foundation
NSO National Solar Observatory
NSWP National Space Weather Program
nT nanotesla (magnetic-field strength)
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
RAL Rutherford Appleton Laboratory
R&A Research and Analysis
SAT Space and Advanced Technology
SATCOM Satellite Communications
SDO Solar Dynamics Observatory
SDR Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction
SEP Solar Energetic Particle
SERVIR Regional Visualization and Monitoring System
SOFIA Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy
SOHO Solar and Heliophysics Observatory
SOLIS Solar Long-Term Investigations of the Sun
SPoRT Short-term Prediction Research and Transition
SSWI Society and Space Weather Institute
STEREO Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatories
STFC Science and Technology Facilities Council
SWPC Space Weather Prediction Center
TEC Total Electron Count
THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
UHF ultra high frequency
UK United Kingdom
USAF United States Air Force
var volt-amperes reactive
VHF very high frequency
VSM Vector SpectroMagnetograph
WAAS Wide Area Augmentation System
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
  Our globally-connected society, its  security and its economic 
well-being depend critically on the reliable availability of 
electrical power, communications systems, precision timing 
and spatial positioning, and Earth-observing satellites. The 
large-scale electrical grids and the space-based technologies 
needed for this are susceptible to space weather, which has 
triggered satellite failures, power-grid blackouts, and 
communications outages. Space weather is  continually 
varying. Observations  of Sun-like stars suggest that space 
storms can be much larger than experienced in the modern 
electronic age, even as  our society becomes  ever more 
dependent on these susceptible systems. Societal costs of 
severe space weather may run into trillions of dollars (p. 11). 
  Our understanding of space weather and - in particular - its 
impacts  on society are in their infancy. Societal sensitivity to 
high-impact, low-frequency events  is obviously substantial. 
The investigation of how space weather impacts various 
components of our high-tech society is essential to national 
and international economic and military security, and should 
be a core ingredient in strategic design, regulation, and construction of a resilient technological infrastructure. 
     The multidisciplinary nature of societal impacts  of space weather suggests the formation of an Institute shaped by a 
partnership between government, industry, and academia. The Institute’s  fundamental goal of studying societal effects of 
space-weather phenomena ensures  that it will complement - not duplicate or compete with - existing organizations for 
research, forecasting, and advice.
     The Institute will (1) integrate and evaluate knowledge of space-weather phenomena and consequences from all 
relevant sources, (2) develop moderate-event and extreme-event scenarios with realistic analysis-based societal 
impacts, (3) provide evaluations  of space-weather impacts  on new technological applications, (4) assess enhanced 
discovery potential with advancing instrumentation, methodologies, synergies, and funding structures, (5) provide 
independent assessment and evaluation of effectiveness of forecasting and monitoring systems, of response plans  and 
resources, and of space-weather information-distribution and alert systems, (6) interface with scientists, forecasters, 
engineers, and leaders in government and society in emergency planning and preparedness, in policy development, and 
in international coordination, and (7) develop courses  for scientists, societal leaders, emergency responders, media, and 
public, and serve as a training center for all categories of stakeholders. The Institute would provide guidance and assess 
options for policy makers on improving society’s resilience and on reducing susceptibility. 
     This document outlines how such an Institute can take shape, growing from a 3-year maturation phase to its full-scale 
operation. In its fully-operational mode (at approximately $8M/y) it would be supported by grants from government and 
industry, subject to periodic performance reviews, while setting its own priorities and initiating its studies subject to 
advice from a Board of Directors and a Panel of Experts. A draft plan for its structure is presented on pp. 8 and 9. 
http://science.nasa.gov/media/medialibrary/2010/06/04/SpWeatherPoster1.jpg
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Limiting society’s susceptibility to space weather
      Space weather has many parallels 
to weather on Earth. It, too, comes in 
mild and extreme forms, affects our 
technological infrastructure, and is 
studied so that it can be forecast, 
accommodated for in system designs, 
and considered in catastrophe 
scenarios. Space weather, originating 
in the Sun’s magnetism, involves 
electromagnetic forces that lie outside 
day-to-day experience, but the 
impacts are as real as those of 
terrestrial weather. Storms in space 
result in satellite outages, interruptions 
in electrical power, communications, 
navigation, ﬁnancial services, the 
internet ... Space weather affects 
everything that relies on our electrical 
and electronic technologies. 
      A workshop organized by the 
National Research Council on 
understanding of societal and 
economic impacts of space weather 
(see excerpts on p. 11) concluded that 
“[w]hile this workshop, along with its 
report, has gathered in one place 
much of what is currently known or 
suspected about societal and 
economic impacts [of space weather], 
it has perhaps been most successful 
in illuminating the scope of the myriad 
issues involved, and the gaps in 
knowledge that remain to be explored 
in greater depth than can be 
accomplished in a workshop. A 
quantitative and comprehensive 
assessment of the societal and 
economic impacts of severe space 
weather will be a truly daunting task 
[...]" 
   Our society has evolved to respond 
to the beneﬁts and threats posed by 
weather: our infrastructure is designed 
so that it can withstand what we can 
commonly expect from the daily and 
seasonal weather changes. For 
extreme weather - such as hurricanes, 
ﬂoods, ice storms, and heat waves - 
risk assessments result in design 
decisions, building codes, 
requirements on infrastructure 
resilience, warning systems, and 
evacuation plans.
     An effective response to space 
weather requires an understanding of 
the many pathways by which strong 
electromagnetic pulses impact the 
complex, computer-operated systems 
that form the controlling core of our 
societal infrastructure. Proper 
response plans for space-weather 
hazards remain to be developed 
because the nature of the risk is not 
understood well enough. Electric 
power companies, for example, may 
be increasingly aware of space 
weather, but preparedness for the 
complex system-level interactions that 
it may cause is not yet fully developed. 
DHS/FEMA may incorporate space-
weather impacts in emergency 
exercises, but these start from 
hypothetical scenarios for the initial 
damage caused by the solar event or 
how its effects propagate through the 
electronic and electrical infrastructure.  
   Because of the weak understanding 
of the linkages from causes to effects, 
it has not been possible to formulate 
optimal regulations, design rules, and 
emergency plans for a resilient society 
subject to space weather.  Designs for 
communication, navigation, and other 
technologies do not yet adequately 
reﬂect known space-weather threats, 
while the Sun may have more extreme 
events in store.  
   Dealing with space weather threats 
necessarily involves many segments of 
society (illustrated in the cover image): 
legislators, emergency planners, 
industry sectors, forecasters, and 
scientists with a wide variety of 
backgrounds.  Taking space weather 
events, in their rich diversity (illustrated 
in the ﬁgure on the facing page),
 into the equally rich diversity of 
societal aspects requires that experts 
from all of the disciplines and 
impacted parties interacting in an 
environment that stimulates the 
exchange of knowledge and the 
development of new ideas.
   Assessing societal risks from space 
weather requires an organization that 
coordinates investigations of the many 
pathways in which space weather 
affects the highly-coupled systems of 
economy and security, and that 
provides options on how to make 
national and international 
infrastructures secure and resilient 
against the effects of space weather, 
from the moderate ever- present 
variability to the low- frequency, high-
impact extremes. 
_______________________________
Internet addresses to various international 
organizations, and excerpts from studies from 
government and industry are provided on pages 
11 through 15 in this brochure.
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Space weather effects do not respect 
international boundaries, and local 
space-weather impacts readily cause 
global consequences in our tightly 
connected world economy. 
Geomagnetic storms couple sensitive 
high-latitude regions from the northern 
US and Canada to Scandinavia and 
other northern European countries, 
into their continental surroundings 
through the web of power grids.  Solar 
eruptions cause ionospheric 
perturbations over the entire Sun-
facing hemisphere of the Earth. 
Energetic-particle storms affect 
navigation, communication, and 
surveillance satellites regardless of 
their country of origin. Low-frequency 
extreme events - such as hurricanes, 
tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, nuclear 
power plant failures, and oil spills - 
have recently demonstrated that  
highly coupled economic systems can 
suffer very expensive consequences 
when one signiﬁcant portion fails and 
its effects cascade through society.
   Institutes for Society and Space 
Weather in different parts of the world 
can and must work side by side 
without duplication of effort, creating 
the opportunity for industries and 
governments of diverse origin to work 
together, train together, and decide 
together on the priorities for research, 
preparation, resilience, and response.
International by its nature
UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF SPACE WEATHER
LARGE SPACE-WEATHER EVENTS ARE RARE
• High-impact, low-frequency events like solar storms do not occur with sufﬁcient regularity to instill experience-based 
awareness. Therefore, stakeholders must promote awareness through detailed simulations of disturbances throughout the 
complex electronic infrastructure and of lessons learned from national and international disaster/crisis management 
exercise programs.
SPACE STORM CONSEQUENCES ARE GLOBAL
• Large impacts can span multiple continents, so impact is global, interest is inherently international, and multi-national 
stakeholders beneﬁt from sharing of knowledge and resources.
SPACE WEATHER IMPACTS MULTIPLE TECHNOLOGIES SIMULTANEOUSLY
• Power grid, GPS, communication, surveillance, transportation, ...
SPACE WEATHER IS OUTSIDE THE REALM OF EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE
• The often complex electro-magnetic effects complicate communication from expert scientist to impacted societal 
leader and vice versa. 
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Needs from the users communities
    Reports from government, industry, 
and academia (some are quoted 
below, see other excerpts on pp. 11 
-13, and web resources on p. 15) 
suggest that an Institute for Society 
and Space Weather should have at 
least the following functions (distilled 
into its core roles in the box below): 
TRANSLATE FORECASTS, 
NOWCASTS, AND KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE SUN-EARTH SYSTEM INTO 
ACTIONABLE KNOWLEDGE 
• Translation of industry/government 
needs to science community. 
Translation of scientiﬁcally 
formulated impact potential to 
estimates societal impacts. 
Integration of experts/researchers 
and emergency management in 
response teams during both real and 
rehearsed emergencies. Need to 
“provide sufﬁcient clarity of the 
threat so that organizations can 
understand how the danger is 
relevant to their operations.” 
“Workshop participants highlighted 
the need to assess the vulnerability 
of technological systems that could 
be impacted by space weather 
conditions.“ 
PROVIDE ADVICE BEFORE, DURING, 
AND AFTER SPACE WEATHER 
INDUCED DISASTROUS EVENTS
 
• Expert knowledge needed to 
integrate knowledge, to assess its 
practical value and limitations, 
assess its usefulness as 
technologies and sensitivities 
change, and to present it in a 
coherent way to both scientists and 
end users. “In many cases, both the 
private and public sectors do not 
fully understand the level of 
interconnectivity between various 
infrastructures and therefore do not 
grasp the extent of the space 
weather threat." 
• Resource needed to interact with 
media and general public. “This point 
of contact can encourage and 
facilitate communication with the 
private sector on space weather 
issues, contingency plans, and 
recovery procedures." 
ACT AS A TRAINING RESOURCE 
• Training resource for leaders in 
government, industry, and science as 
they frequently rotate through 
assignments. “It is recommended that 
stakeholders build a process for 
sharing the knowledge of subject 
matter experts (SMEs) during space 
weather-related exercise planning and 
conduct." “The participants suggested 
the development of educational 
mechanisms that leaders and staffers 
can access when they arrive in ofﬁce." 
STIMULATE INTERNATIONAL 
COLLABORATION, COORDINATION, 
AND INFORMATION SHARING 
Institute for Society and Space Weather
INSTITUTE’S ROLES
1.Integrate and evaluate knowledge of space-weather phenomena and consequences from all relevant sources  (in part by 
acting as a research center with professional staff and visitors of a wide range of backgrounds and interests) to 
establish probabilities of occurrence of impacts of a given magnitude
2.Develop moderate-event and extreme-event scenarios  with realistic analysis-based impacts  on power, navigation, 
timing or communications systems that change with evolving technologies, and provide event-response manuals for the 
various national and international responding organizations
3.Provide evaluations of space-weather impacts on new technological applications
4.Assess enhanced discovery potential with advancing instrumentation, methodologies, synergies, and funding structures
5.Provide independent assessment and evaluation of effectiveness of forecasting and monitoring systems, of response 
plans and resources, and of space-weather information-distribution and alert systems
6.Interface with scientists, forecasters, and leaders in government and society in emergency planning and preparedness, 
in policy development, and in international coordination.
7.Develop educational and informational materials and courses for scientists, societal leadership, emergency responders, 
media, and public; and serve as training center for all classes of stakeholders
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Research into space weather
          Space agencies, NASA foremost 
among them, are pushing the frontiers 
of our understanding of our variable 
space environment.  Additional 
research is supported by NSF, DOD 
and DOE. In Europe and Asia, space 
research organizations and national 
research foundations add to those 
efforts in the international 
collaboration of research. 
Space weather modeling
   The vastness of the space 
between us and the Sun means that 
sensor networks can only sample 
space weather locally. Numerical 
models, in which physics-based 
computer codes extend the sensor 
sites to cover the Sun-to-Earth 
pathways, are critical complements to 
space- and ground-based 
instruments.  University and National 
Laboratory research modules and the 
NASA Community Coordinated 
Modeling Center (CCMC) are 
examples of these model 
environments, supported by NASA, 
NSF, and other partners of the 
National Space Weather Program.
Forecasting space weather
Within NOAA, the Space Weather 
Prediction Center is responsible for 
providing space-weather forecasts 
and alerts to a large variety of 
customers, based on observations, 
models, and decades-long expertise 
of the expert forecasting staff. 
What is missing?
Awareness and understanding of 
the needs of society by the research 
community and their funding 
organizations must be increased 
substantially. Part of that role resides 
in the US National Space Weather 
Program, which manages the multi-
agency strategy. But even that 
organization does not have the 
required expertise to assess risks for 
everyday or catastrophic space 
weather impacts on the variety of 
societal segments that are susceptible 
to space weather. 
How to proceed?
       We need to transcend the 
boundaries of scientiﬁc discipline of 
heliophysics, and seek support from 
space weather stakeholders and 
regulatory communities. A partnership 
can be established that reaches 
beyond NASA and NSF with funding 
from, e.g., DOE, and DOD, 
complemented by industrial partners 
in communication, navigation, and 
electricity branches, to establish an 
independent organization that can 
integrate knowledge from diverse 
sources into value-enhanced products  
that can be used in day-to-day 
dealings with space weather, as well 
as in the development of policy 
guidelines for government, industry, 
and academia. 
      The next step in the chain requires 
translation of the forecasts into 
actionable knowledge and risk 
assessments. This requires that we 
understand the predictive value of the 
forecasts. But it also requires that we 
understand what impacts it is likely to 
have, how extensive the impacts may 
be, how the impacts may percolate 
from one technology to another thus 
cascading through societal segments. 
All these issues for space weather are 
analogous to what we would ask about 
weather on Earth. Where can one turn 
to ﬁnd out? 
- a partnership
An Institute for 
Society and 
Space Weather 
forms the 
natural hub for 
interactions 
between 
research, 
forecasting, 
regulation, and 
economy on any 
of the multitude 
of societal 
components 
that can be 
affected by 
space-weather 
events.
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Mission description	
    The primary functions of the Institute 
for Society and Space Weather (ISSW) 
- detailed on p. 6 - are to integrate, 
evaluate, disseminate, and teach 
knowledge of space weather and its 
diverse impacts on society, and act as 
a source of public domain knowledge 
and advice to all partners. ISSW 
operates as a non-governmental, not-
for-proﬁt organization, funded by 
several government organizations and 
industrial and academic partners.
    During an initial 3-year maturation 
phase the mode of operation and the 
balance of its activities are being 
tuned to the needs of its societal 
partners, guided by a board of 
directors from those partners and by 
an advisory expert panel. In this 
phase, ISSW should grow to a 
professional staff of four to six experts 
in disciplines that include heliophysics, 
engineering, economics, and security, 
partnering with academic groups in 
science and business schools. A 
support staff of administration, IT 
functions, and PR personnel is also 
foreseen. This staff will operate in a 
facility with visitor ofﬁces, meeting 
facilities, and a computer center. 
    After the 3-year startup phase, 
ISSW should be funded to execute its 
activities independently, subject to 
periodic external review, with general 
funding to be allocated by its directors  
and panel of experts. 
Products and services
    ISSW will have six primary functions 
(with a distribution approximately as in 
the chart below): 
1. Study-team reports: Expert teams, 
assembled from both community-
based proposals and by ISSW 
initiative, will study a variety of aspects  
from Sun to society, to be published in 
peer reviewed journals or on line by 
ISSW. 
2. Educational materials and courses 
for on-site teaching (with ‘expert 
certiﬁcation’ in space weather) for all 
interested parties, produced at cost to 
the customers. 
3. Reports or advice in response to 
requests from government or industry, 
published as public domain materials 
after internal review. 
4. Self-directed meta-analyses in 
which literature studies are interpreted 
and combined into broader knowledge 
and subject review publications. 
5. Scenarios with quantitative risk 
information on space weather impacts. 
6. Expert advice for emergency 
simulations and responses. 
Sponsors
     ISSW will seek funding and indirect 
support from a variety of sources: 
• Government: DHS/FEMA, FAA, DOE, 
DOD, NASA, NSF
• Academia: business and 
management schools and risk 
analysis and mitigation centers. 
These partnerships may involve the 
development of curricula and 
undergraduate and graduate student 
internships at the Institute. 
• Industry: communication, navigation, 
aviation, etc. 
• Private foundations. 
     ISSW will seek three types of 
funding: (1) undirected grants in 
support of general activities from 
lasting partners, (2) support for 
community-initiated study teams and 
meta-analyses and their publication 
mostly through NASA and NSF, (3) 
funding for studies, reports, and 
impact scenarios through charges by 
the sponsors, to be published by the 
Institute subject only to interval review 
by directors and panel of experts. 
Institute structure
Study-team support
Educational materials/Courses
Advice/reports on space weather impacts
Self-directed meta-analyses
Scenario development/Impact analysis
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Projected budget growth from a 3-year maturation 
phase (in which customer needs and course materials 
are established) to a fully operational phase in which all 
activities, as shown in the pie chart to the left, are 
deployed.
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Institute structure cnt’d
Management	
      The Institute will be managed as a 
not-for-proﬁt NGO. A Board of 
Directors and an Expert Panel would 
advise the directors on the strategic 
and tactical planning for activities, 
respectively. The Board will ensure 
alignment with domestic and 
international priorities, guidance on 
strategic partnerships, liaising with 
advisory bodies in government and 
academia, etc. The Expert Council will 
advise on the selection of study 
topics, setting priorities for internal 
independent research, guidance on 
the development of training courses 
and educational materials, etc. 
      The Institute is to operate as an 
independent organization, accepting 
funding without speciﬁc direction for 
its research and training activities, and 
contract funding for speciﬁc tasks 
resulting in public domain reports. The 
Institute will be subject to peer review 
for continuation of its grants in a 
review process jointly organized by its 
primary sponsors. 
 
Operations
      The Institute’s primary products  
(summarized on p. 8) suggest a 
professional staff of 6 subject experts 
(either full-time employed or a 
comparable complement of part-time 
staff), with a support staff of four 
administrative assistants. Together, 
this staff is to engage in its own meta- 
analyses and support study teams. 
These study teams, supported for their 
local expenses to meet a few times 
per year for approximately a week 
each time) would be constituted from 
the communities of academia, 
government and industry, either as per 
external proposal or at the initiative of 
the Institute itself. 
      The Institute will be able to host 
interns of a variety of backgrounds in 
training at universities, and can host 
fellows that bring speciﬁc expertise to 
projects for periods of weeks up to a 
year. 
      The Institute will also host (at least 
on-site, and perhaps at other locations 
if useful) certiﬁcate training courses in 
space weather impacts on society for 
interested parties (paying for the cost 
of the course, and thus eventually a 
cost-neutral element of the overall 
budget). 
      Overall, half of the Institute’s 
funding should come from lasting 
strategic partnership grants and half 
from contracts on education, training, 
and targeted studies. 
     The Institute’s studies linking 
societal impacts to physical processes  
would be directed by an expert panel 
composed of the Institute’s 
professional staff, designated 
members of the Board of Directors, 
and external experts including liaisons 
to associated university departments 
and academic centers, with a total 
membership of about 18. The 
members of this Panel would prioritize 
the Institute’s activities, guide studies 
and reporting activities, review study 
reports and advise the authoring 
groups from their wide backgrounds 
and expertise; at least one Panel 
member will participate in each study 
in a leading role. This management 
structure ensures communication 
between study teams, staff, and 
institute partners in government, 
academia, and industry.
Institute budget, with components from 
partnership grants (contiguous wedges) 
and contract funding (separated wedges).
$0.80M
$0.80M
$2.70M
$0.50M
$0.80M
$2.30M
Research and support staff
Site costs (building, facilities, computers, support)
Education: fellowships
Study contracts
Education: training and material development
Study teams, board and council support
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Principles of operation
Charges
    The charge of any organization for a 
study will be evaluated and approved 
by the staff and the permanent 
committee. If during the course of a 
study the group carrying it out should 
ﬁnd that essential issues not originally 
included in the charge would need to 
be included to reach a sound 
conclusion, the Institute director will 
notify the funder that there are 
important issues not included in the 
charge. The funder will then have 
several options: 1) to end support for 
the study and have the unexpended 
funds refunded; 2) to encourage the 
study to continue and to provide 
additional funds to expand the 
evaluation; 3) to discuss any reasons 
why expanding on the charge would 
not be valuable. Regardless of the 
decision of the funder, the Institute can 
use any information that it has 
obtained to develop the report as 
recommended by the committee of 
advisors. Reports from the Institute are 
not subject to review by the funding 
organization. 
Reporting
The Institute will shape its reports 
in the form of options for action 
scenarios supported by detailed 
rationales. Different organizations may, 
and probably will, have different 
responses to the assessments made 
by the Institute. The options will 
hopefully bound the range of 
recommended responses that are 
made at the then current state of 
knowledge. In a changing state of both 
our knowledge of space weather and 
the interactions of our technologies, 
the relevance of any set of options will 
most certainly evolve. The options 
given for dealing with serious issues 
will be regularly reviewed and the 
Institute will respond to requests of its 
funders and its board of directors about 
option reviews. 
Review
      Institute studies will be reviewed by 
the board of directors, the permanent 
committee, and selected outside 
reviewers who may have additional 
insights to the topics considered. The 
Institute will not be bound to comply 
with the concerns of either outside 
reviewers or the funders. The decision 
to publish resides entirely within the 
judgment of the director and the 
permanent committee. The main form 
of publication will be electronic and 
open to all. In those cases where 
options concern national security, 
distribution or the report may be 
limited. 
http://www.dhs.gov/ﬁles/programs/editorial_0827.shtm
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Severe Space Weather Events -
Understanding Societal 
and Economic Impacts
"Because of the 
interconnectedness of 
critical infrastructures in 
modern society, the impacts  
of severe space weather 
events can go beyond 
disruption of existing 
technical systems and lead 
to short-term as well as to 
long-term collateral 
socioeconomic disruptions. 
Electric power is modern 
society’s cornerstone 
technology, the technology 
on which virtually all other 
infrastructures and services 
depend. [...] Collateral 
effects of a longer-term 
outage would likely include, 
for example, disruption of 
the transportation, 
communication, banking, 
and ﬁnance systems, and 
government services; the 
breakdown of the 
distribution of potable water 
owing to pump failure; and 
the loss of perishable foods 
and medications because of 
lack of refrigeration."
"Our knowledge and 
understanding of the 
vulnerabilities of modern 
technological infrastructure 
to severe space weather 
and the measures 
developed to mitigate those 
vulnerabilities are based 
largely on experience and 
knowledge gained during 
the past 20 or 30 years, 
during such episodes of 
severe space weather as the 
geomagnetic superstorms 
of March 1989 and October-
November 2003. As severe 
as some of these recent 
events have been, the 
historical record reveals that 
space weather of even 
greater severity has 
occurred in the past—e.g., 
the Carrington event of 
18591 and the great 
geomagnetic storm of May 
1921—and suggests that 
such extreme events, 
though rare, are likely to 
occur again some time in 
the future."
"[...] the nation’s electric 
power grids remain 
vulnerable to disruption and 
damage by severe space 
weather and have become 
even more so, in terms of 
both widespread blackouts 
and permanent equipment 
damage requiring long 
restoration times. 
According to a study by the 
Metatech Corporation, the 
occurrence today 
of an event like the 
1921 storm would 
result in large-
scale blackouts 
affecting more 
than 130 million 
people and would 
expose more than 
350 transformers 
to the risk of 
permanent 
damage." 
"[...] an 
estimate of $1 
trillion to $2 trillion during 
the ﬁrst year alone was 
given for the societal and 
economic costs of a 
“severe geomagnetic 
storm scenario” with 
recovery times of 4 to 10 
years."
"What are the societal 
and economic impacts of 
severe space weather? [...] 
While this workshop, along 
with its report, has gathered 
in one place much of what is  
currently known or 
suspected about societal 
and economic impacts, it 
has perhaps been most 
successful in illuminating 
the scope of the myriad 
issues involved, and the 
gaps in knowledge that 
remain to be explored in 
greater depth than can be 
accomplished in a 
workshop. A quantitative 
and comprehensive 
assessment of the societal 
and economic impacts of 
severe space weather will 
be a truly daunting task [...]"
From “Severe Space Weather Events--Understanding
Societal and Economic Impacts: a Workshop Report “;
Committee on the Societal and Economic Impacts of 
Severe Space Weather Events, National Research 
Council; published in 2008 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12507.html
Quotes from the literature
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Space Weather - Its impact on 
Earth and implications for business
"The risks posed by 
space weather are now 
magniﬁed through what 
some commentators have 
called “creeping 
dependency”, which means 
the growth of interconnect-
ed systems that business 
and other activities rely on. 
[...] Therefore a space 
weather event could have 
wider regional and even 
global impacts: by triggering 
cascading failures across 
systems."
"In recent years, satellite 
navigation services in 
Europe and the US have 
been strengthened by 
’augmentation systems’, 
which generate ionospheric 
correction data and enable 
satnav receivers to measure 
aircraft altitudes with 
accuracy to approximately 
10 metres. However, during 
the severe space weather 
storms in October 2003 the 
vertical error limit of 50 
metres set by the FAA was 
exceeded, even with the 
augmentation system, and 
could not be used for 
aircraft navigation and 
speciﬁcally precision 
landings."
"The 2003 [space 
weather] events also 
revealed some novel 
aspects of the threat to 
power grids. The loss of 14 
transformers in South Africa 
and the loss of 13% of 
power in the grid showed 
that cumulative damage due 
to a series of moderate 
space weather events - 
rather than a single big 
event, as in 1989 - can be 
just as harmful."
"Time-stamping of 
ﬁnancial transactions is 
critical to the operation of 
many ﬁnancial markets. In 
general, these timestamps 
are derived from satellite 
navigation services and 
sometimes via intermediary 
services on the internet. 
They are therefore 
vulnerable to disruption of 
access to those satellite 
services by space weather; 
for example, loss of signal in 
severe space weather 
conditions."
"The ideal response to 
space weather risks is to 
build robust assets and 
systems that can operate 
through bad space weather 
conditions. [...] The building 
of robust systems will 
impose extra 
costs on business, 
and some 
measures may 
reduce the 
capacity of 
businesses to 
deliver services to 
customers, 
therefore reducing 
potential income. 
[...] This approach 
relies on obtaining 
information on 
space weather 
conditions and converting to 
a useful format."
"The market demand for 
specialist services has been 
the subject of several 
studies funded by the 
European Space Agency. A 
market survey carried out in 
2000 and 2001 found a 
strong need for services 
focused on customer needs: 
•Potential customers 
were willing to pay for space 
weather services that 
convert scientiﬁc data into 
forms that are meaningful to 
operations staff with a 
minimum of additional 
training. For example, a 
simple index indicating the 
level of threat.
• It also found that 
potential customers were 
not willing to pay for 
scientiﬁc data. They saw 
that as a raw product that 
should be generated by 
public sector activities. 
It seems not much has 
changed in the last ten 
years.  Many existing 
services remain science-led 
and fail to provide this focus 
on customer needs."
From "Space Weather - Its impacts on Earth and 
implications for business", a Brieﬁng in Lloyd’s 360-
degree Risk Insight; published in 2011.
http://www.lloyds.com/360
Quotes from the literature
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Managing Critical Disasters in the 
Transatlantic Domain - The Case of 
a Geomagnetic Storm
"[...] expert knowledge 
is of the essence for 
emergency managers 
before, during, and after 
disastrous events. This is 
especially true in novel 
events, or during infrequent 
contingencies. It is also 
important that experts are 
aware of how the 
emergency management 
sector functions and that a 
mutual understanding exists 
regarding the critical 
importance of providing 
timely information and 
advice."
"Workshop participants 
highlighted the need to 
assess the vulnerability of 
technological systems that 
could be impacted by space 
weather conditions. They 
raised concerns that, in 
many cases, both the 
private and public sectors 
do not fully understand the 
level of interconnectivity 
between various infra-
structures and therefore do 
not grasp the extent of the 
space weather threat.  
If industry leaders 
understand the impacts of 
geomagnetic storms on the 
electrical generation and 
transmission system and 
technological equipment, 
they can develop plans and 
procedures to make 
systems more resilient."
"[A] geomagnetic storm 
can destroy large electrical 
transformers which are 
expensive and time 
consuming to replace. 
Because of the cost, most 
electric companies do not 
keep spare transformers on-
hand. Even if an electric 
company is able to locate 
spare transformers, 
transportation and 
installation would take at 
least three weeks. New 
orders for replacement 
equipment can take up to 
18 months or even longer to 
fulﬁll. If Sweden, Great 
Britain, and the United 
States all suffered 
transformer damage from a 
geomagnetic storm, it would 
be difﬁcult for equipment 
providers to prioritize which 
countries should receive 
replacement parts."
"Population centers 
have limited food and 
commodity inventories on 
hand. Hospital supply 
systems, for instance, 
operate on a just-in-time 
replenishment cycle. 
Generators are 
seldom installed 
and are often 
intended to be 
used for a very 
short period. 
Major electrical 
outages would 
wreak havoc with 
the supply chain 
management 
system for these 
and other critical 
supplies. 
Replenishing these 
supplies requires operable 
telecommunications 
systems, data processing 
capability, and the fuel to 
transport shipments."
 "It is recommended 
that a centralized 
government point of contact 
for media and public 
inquiries be in place for 
space weather-related 
issues. This point of contact 
can encourage and facilitate 
communication with the 
private sector on space 
weather issues, contingency 
plans, and recovery 
procedures. Social media, 
such as Facebook and 
Twitter, should be employed 
along with videos and 
podcasts on Government 
web sites to educate the 
public on space weather 
and its impacts."
From "Managing Critical Disasters in the Trans-
atlantic Domain – The Case of a Geomagnetic Storm", a 
workshop report by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) in partnership with the 
European Union, European Commission, Swedish 
government, U.S. National Weather Service (NWS), and 
the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency 
(NOAA); published in 2010.
Quotes from the literature
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Select web resources
NOAA Space Weather Scales                                    http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/NOAAscales/NOAAscales.pdf 
Severe Space Weather Events – 
Understanding Societal and Economic Impacts                                       http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12507.html
A Profile of Space Weather                                                   http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/primer/primer_2010.pdf
National Response Framework (NRF) Resource Center              http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/index.htm 
Service Assessment: Intense Space Weather Storms October 19 – 
November 07, 2003                            http://www.nws.noaa.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/SWstorms_assessment.pdf 
International Space Environment Service                                                         http://www.ises-spaceweather.org/ 
Environment Fact Sheet: Civil Protection: 
Together We Are Stronger                               http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/pdfdocs/2007_factsheet.pdf 
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System                           http://www.gdacs.org/about/GDACS_JRC.pdf 
Joint Research Centre: European Commission                              http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/index.cfm?id=1370 
                                                                                     http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_passport_en.pdf 
From Floods to Forest Fires: Early Warning Systems
                                                          http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_leaflet_warning_systems_en.pdf 
U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)              http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) 
          http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/l33260_en.htm
SWPC, Space Weather Prediction Centre (US)                                                                                        http://www.swpc.noaa.gov
SWENET, Space Weather European Network (ESA)                                                        http://www.esa-spaceweather.net/swenet
IPS Radio and Space Services (Australia)                                                                                                        http://www.ips.gov.au
ISES, International Space Environment Service                                                                           http://www.ises-spaceweather.org
SolarMetrics, Professional Space Weather Services for Aerospace                                                      http://www.solarmetrics.com
QinetiQ Atmospheric Radiation Model                                                                                        http://www.qarm.space.qinetiq.com
GIC Now!                                                                                                       http://www.aurora.fmi.ﬁ/gic_service/english/index.html
GIC Simulator                                                                                                           http://www.spaceweather.gc.ca/se-gic-eng.php
Solar Wind Monitoring and Induction Modeling for GIC                                                        http://www.geomag.bgs.ac.uk/gicpublic
Metatech Corporation, Applied Power Solutions Division
& Geomagnetic Storm Forecasting Services                                                         http://www.metatechcorp.com/aps/apsmain.html
BGS Geomagnetism Applications and Services                                                            http://www.geomag.bgs.ac.uk/services.html
Space Weather Service for Pipelines                                                                       http://www.spaceweather.gc.ca/se-pip-eng.php
Space Weather; the International Journal of Research and Applications                                         http://www.agu.org/journals/sw/
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NOAA Space Weather Scales 
 
Category Effect Physical 
measure 
Average Frequency  
(1 cycle = 11 years) 
Scale Descriptor Duration of event will influence severity of effects   
Geomagnetic Storms 
Kp values* 
determined 
every 3 hours 
Number of storm events 
when Kp level was met; 
(number of storm days) 
G 5 Extreme 
Power systems: widespread voltage control problems and protective system problems can occur, some grid 
systems may experience complete collapse or blackouts. Transformers may experience damage. 
Spacecraft operations: may experience extensive surface charging, problems with orientation, uplink/downlink 
and tracking satellites. 
Other systems: pipeline currents can reach hundreds of amps, HF (high frequency) radio propagation may be 
impossible in many areas for one to two days, satellite navigation may be degraded for days, low-frequency radio 
navigation can be out for hours, and aurora has been seen as low as Florida and southern Texas (typically 40° 
geomagnetic lat.).** 
Kp=9 4 per cycle 
(4 days per cycle) 
 
G 4 Severe 
Power systems: possible widespread voltage control problems and some protective systems will mistakenly trip 
out key assets from the grid. 
Spacecraft operations: may experience surface charging and tracking problems, corrections may be needed for 
orientation problems. 
Other systems: induced pipeline currents affect preventive measures, HF radio propagation sporadic, satellite 
navigation degraded for hours, low-frequency radio navigation disrupted, and aurora has been seen as low as 
Alabama and northern California (typically 45° geomagnetic lat.).** 
Kp=8 100 per cycle 
(60 days per cycle) 
 
G 3 Strong 
Power systems: voltage corrections may be required, false alarms triggered on some protection devices. 
Spacecraft operations: surface charging may occur on satellite components, drag may increase on low-Earth-orbit 
satellites, and corrections may be needed for orientation problems. 
Other systems: intermittent satellite navigation and low-frequency radio navigation problems may occur, HF 
radio may be intermittent, and aurora has been seen as low as Illinois and Oregon  (typically 50° geomagnetic 
lat.).** 
Kp=7 200 per cycle  
(130 days per cycle) 
 
G 2 Moderate 
Power systems: high-latitude power systems may experience voltage alarms, long-duration storms may cause 
transformer damage. 
Spacecraft operations: corrective actions to orientation may be required by ground control; possible changes in 
drag affect orbit predictions. 
Other systems: HF radio propagation can fade at higher latitudes, and aurora has been seen as low as New York 
and Idaho (typically 55° geomagnetic lat.).** 
Kp=6 600 per cycle 
(360 days per cycle) 
 
G 1 Minor 
Power systems: weak power grid fluctuations can occur.  
Spacecraft operations: minor impact on satellite operations possible. 
Other systems: migratory animals are affected at this and higher levels; aurora is commonly visible at high 
latitudes (northern Michigan and Maine).** 
Kp=5 1700 per cycle 
(900 days per cycle) 
*         Based on this measure, but other physical measures are also considered. 
**       For specific locations around the globe, use geomagnetic latitude to determine likely sightings (see www.swpc.noaa.gov/Aurora)  
Solar Radiation Storms 
Flux level of > 
10 MeV 
particles (ions)* 
Number of events when 
flux level was met** 
S 5 Extreme 
Biological: unavoidable high radiation hazard to astronauts on EVA (extra-vehicular activity); passengers and 
crew in high-flying aircraft at high latitudes may be exposed to radiation risk. *** 
Satellite operations:  satellites may be rendered useless, memory impacts can cause loss of control, may cause 
serious noise in image data, star-trackers may be unable to locate sources; permanent damage to solar panels 
possible. 
Other systems: complete blackout of HF (high frequency) communications possible through the polar regions, 
and position errors make navigation operations extremely difficult. 
105 Fewer than 1 per cycle 
S 4 Severe 
Biological: unavoidable radiation hazard to astronauts on EVA; passengers and crew in high-flying aircraft at 
high latitudes may be exposed to radiation risk.*** 
Satellite operations: may experience memory device problems and noise on imaging systems; star-tracker 
problems may cause orientation problems, and solar panel efficiency can be degraded. 
Other systems: blackout of HF radio communications through the polar regions and increased navigation errors 
over several days are likely. 
104 3 per cycle 
 
 
S 3 Strong 
Biological: radiation hazard avoidance recommended for astronauts on EVA; passengers and crew in high-flying 
aircraft at high latitudes may be exposed to radiation risk.*** 
Satellite operations: single-event upsets, noise in imaging systems, and slight reduction of efficiency in solar 
panel are likely. 
Other systems: degraded HF radio propagation through the polar regions and navigation position errors likely. 
103 10 per cycle 
 
 
S 2 Moderate 
Biological: passengers and crew in high-flying aircraft at high latitudes may be exposed to elevated radiation 
risk.*** 
Satellite operations: infrequent single-event upsets possible. 
Other systems: effects on HF propagation through the polar regions, and navigation at polar cap locations 
possibly affected. 
102 25 per cycle 
 
S1 Minor 
Biological: none. 
Satellite operations: none. 
Other systems: minor impacts on HF radio in the polar regions. 
10 50 per cycle 
*        Flux levels are 5 minute averages. Flux in particles·s-1·ster-1·cm-2 Based on this measure, but other physical measures are also considered. 
**      These events can last more than one day. 
***    High energy particle (>100 MeV) are a better indicator of radiation risk to passenger and crews.  Pregnant women are particularly susceptible. 
 
Radio Blackouts 
GOES X-ray 
peak brightness 
by class and by 
flux* 
Number of events when 
flux level was met; 
(number of storm days) 
R 5 Extreme 
HF Radio: Complete HF (high frequency**) radio blackout on the entire sunlit side of the Earth lasting for a 
number of hours. This results in no HF radio contact with mariners and en route aviators in this sector.  
Navigation: Low-frequency navigation signals used by maritime and general aviation systems experience outages 
on the sunlit side of the Earth for many hours, causing loss in positioning. Increased satellite navigation errors in 
positioning for several hours on the sunlit side of Earth, which may spread into the night side. 
X20 
(2x10-3) 
Fewer than 1 per cycle 
 
 
R 4 Severe 
HF Radio: HF radio communication blackout on most of the sunlit side of Earth for one to two hours. HF radio 
contact lost during this time. 
Navigation: Outages of low-frequency navigation signals cause increased error in positioning for one to two 
hours. Minor disruptions of satellite navigation possible on the sunlit side of Earth. 
X10  
(10-3) 
8 per cycle 
(8 days per cycle) 
 
 
R 3 Strong 
HF Radio: Wide area blackout of HF radio communication, loss of radio contact for about an hour on sunlit side 
of Earth.  
Navigation: Low-frequency navigation signals degraded for about an hour. 
X1 
(10-4)  
175 per cycle 
(140 days per cycle) 
 
R 2 Moderate 
HF Radio: Limited blackout of HF radio communication on sunlit side of the Earth, loss of radio contact for tens 
of minutes.  
Navigation: Degradation of low-frequency navigation signals for tens of minutes. 
M5  
(5x10-5) 
350 per cycle 
(300 days per cycle) 
 
R 1 Minor 
HF Radio: Weak or minor degradation of HF radio communication on sunlit side of the Earth, occasional loss of 
radio contact.  
Navigation: Low-frequency navigation signals degraded for brief intervals. 
M1  
(10-5) 
2000 per cycle 
(950 days per cycle) 
 
*        Flux, measured in the 0.1-0.8 nm range, in W·m-2. Based on this measure, but other physical measures are also considered. 
**      Other frequencies may also be affected by these conditions. 
